Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? In this book, Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused.

In Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, author Micah Zenko presents a new concept to capture and illuminate the phenomenon: "Discrete Military Operations."

"Daryl G. Press uses historical evidence to answer two crucial questions: When a country backs down in a crisis, does its credibility suffer? How do leaders assess their adversaries' credibility? Press illuminates the decision-making processes behind events such as the crises in Europe that preceded World War II, the superpower showdowns over Berlin in the 1950s and 60s, and the Cuban Missile Crisis."--Page 4 of cover.

"Considering a wide range of democratic states, explores the interrelationships among perceived security threats, the militarization of security policy, and democratic accountability"--

The region of South East Europe (SEE), which is home to both NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries, serves as an important corridor between Europe and the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus. In recent years, however, SEE has also experienced high levels of cross-border, military and defense-related challenges in the form of migration, smuggling, terrorism, and cyber threats. Furthermore, the use of the new information environment (IE) to further extremism in SEE and elsewhere in NATO and PfP countries has had far-reaching command and control (C2) implications for the Alliance. A collaborative interdisciplinary, international and regional approach is clearly needed to adequately assess and address these hybrid threats. This book presents papers delivered at the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) event: “Senior Leadership Roundtable on Military and Defense Aspects of Border Security in South East Europe”, held in Berovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* from 23-30 September 2017. The aim of this special SPS grant was to maximize opportunities for extensive dialogue and collaboration between senior regional members, and the almost 70 distinguished academic and legal experts, as well as current or former senior-level practitioners from various governments, NATO bodies, and international organization that participated. It was the first SPS event of its kind in SEE as well as the first NATO SPS grant to be co-executed by the U.S. Department of Defense via the U.S. National Defense University. Other co-organizers were the C4I and Cyber Center of Excellence at George Mason University and PfP partner institution, the General Mihailo Apostolski Military Academy – Skopje, Associate Member of the University of Goce Delčev – Stip. The book is divided into five parts: global trends, defining the problem, policy and academic solutions, national and regional case studies, and technological solutions. It will prove an invaluable source of reference for all those with an interest in the SEE region as well as cross-border hybrid threats, in general. * Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, two of the world's foremost defense authorities, draw on their experience as leaders of the U.S. Defense Department to propose a new American security strategy for the twenty-first century. After a century in which aggression had to be defeated in two world wars and then deterred through a prolonged cold war, the authors argue for a strategy centered on prevention. Now that the cold war is over, it is necessary to rethink the risks to U.S. security. The A list--threats to U.S. survival--is empty today. The B list--the two major regional contingencies in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula that dominate Pentagon planning and budgeting--pose imminent threats to U.S. interests but not to survival. And the C list--such headline-grabbing places as Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti--includes important contingencies that indirectly affect U.S. security but do not directly threaten U.S. interests. Thus the United States is enjoying a period of unprecedented peace and influence; but foreign policy and defense leaders cannot afford to be complacent. The authors' preventive defense strategy concentrates on the dangers that, if mismanaged, have the potential to grow into true A-list threats to U.S. survival in the next century. These include Weimar Russia: failure to establish a self-respecting place for the new Russia in the post-cold war world, allowing it to descend into chaos, isolation, and aggression as Germany did after World War I; Loose Nukes: failure to reduce and secure the deadly legacy of the cold war--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union; A Rising China Turned Hostile: failure to shape China's rise to Asian superpower status so that it emerges as a partner rather than an adversary; Proliferation: spread of weapons of mass destruction; and Catastrophic Terrorism: increase in the scope and intensity of transnational terrorism.They also argue for