Analyzes the massive turmoil afflicting the nation of Sierra Leone, 1995-2002, and the efforts of outside forces to bring stability to that small country. The taxonomy of intervention ranged from private mercenary armies, through the Economic Community of West African States, to the U.N. and the U.K. In every case, those who intervened encountered a common set of difficulties that had to be overcome. Unsurprisingly, they also discovered challenges unique to their own org. and political circumstances. Serving soldiers can often profit vicariously from the mistakes of others as recounted in detailed case studies of historical events. ¿A cautionary tale that political leaders and military planners contemplating intervention in Africa ignore at their peril.¿

This study by Larry J. Woods and Colonel Timothy R. Reese analyzes the massive turmoil afflicting the nation of Sierra Leone, 1995-2002, and the efforts by a variety of outside forces to bring lasting stability to that small country. The taxonomy of intervention ranged from private mercenary armies, through the Economic Community of West African States, to the United Nations and the United Kingdom. In every case, those who intervened encountered a common set of difficulties that had to be overcome. Unsurprisingly, they also discovered challenges unique to their own organizations and political circumstances. This cogent analysis of recent interventions in Sierra Leone represents a cautionary tale that political leaders and military planners contemplating intervention in Africa ignore at their peril. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute)

Almost ten years on from the official end of wars in Sierra Leone (2002) and Liberia (2003), attention is shifting from post-war peacebuilding to longer-term development. What headway has been made? What challenges lie ahead? And what lessons that can be learnt? This issue of Accord draws on experiences and perspectives from across societies in both countries to explore comparative lessons and examine progress, and argues that peacebuilding policy and practice needs to concentrate more on people: on repairing and building relationships among communities, and between communities and the state; and on developing more participatory politics and society that includes marginalised groups. It suggests that customary practices and mechanisms can help deliver essential services across a range sectors, and that local civil society can facilitate national and international policy engagement with them.

The author describes the reasons why humanitarian military interventions succeed or fail, basing his analysis on the interventions carried out in the 1990s in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor.

This book critically examines the Western approach to counter-insurgency in the post-colonial era and offers a series of recommendations to address current shortfalls. The author argues that current approaches to countering insurgency rely too heavily on conflicts from the post-World War II years of waning colonialism. Campaigns conducted over half a century ago – Malaya, Aden, and Kenya among them – remain primary sources on which the United States, British, Australian, and other militaries build their guidance for dealing with insurgent threats, this though both the character of those threats and the conflict environment are significantly different than was the case in those earlier years. This book addresses the resulting inconsistencies by offering insights, analysis, and recommendations drawn from campaigns more applicable to counter-insurgency today. Eight post-colonial conflicts; to include Northern Ireland, Sierra Leone, Colombia and Iraq; provide the basis for analysis. All are examples in which counterinsurgents attained or continue to demonstrate considerable progress when taking on enterprises better known for disaster and disappointment. Recommendations resulting from these analyses challenge entrenched beliefs to serve as the impetus for essential change. Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency will be of much interest to students of counter-insurgencies, military and strategic studies, security studies and IR in general.

This paper is a case study of the British military intervention into Sierra Leone in 2000. The successful British intervention led to defeat of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), final peace accords, and brought order to a failed state. The paper will explore the following points: what was the British foreign policy and what impact did it have in the decision to intervene; what was the British counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and was it useful for the forces in Sierra Leone; did the British forces use their own doctrine or was the situation in Sierra Leone unique; why was the intervention successful and what lessons can be drawn? Beyond the scope of this paper is a comparison of United Kingdom (UK) COIN doctrine and current United States (US) COIN doctrine. The focus will be to analyze the UK’s actions against their doctrine, not the doctrine of the US. There is one major assumption for this case study. The paper categorizes the intervention into Sierra Leone as successful. The justification for the assumption is current day Sierra Leone. Instead of a war torn failed state, Sierra Leone has lasting peace, completed disarmament of insurgent forces, ended the large scale human rights abuse, and democratic elections, not coups, determining the leadership of the country.