'A cracking good read... I will recommend this book to anyone' - Professor Richard Holmes, CBE 'The Falklands, Yom Kippur, Tet and Pearl Harbor? Avoidable intelligence blunders or much worse? Altogether a compelling read from someone who knows the business' - Nigel West This book is a professional military-intelligence officer's - and controversial insider's - view of some of the greatest intelligence blunders of recent history. It includes the serious developments in government misuse of intelligence in the US-led coalition's 2003 war with Iraq, as well as failures of intelligence in Ukraine following Russia's invasion in February 2022. Colonel John Hughes-Wilson analyses not just the events that conspire to cause disaster, but why crucial intelligence is so often ignored, misunderstood or spun by politicians and seasoned generals alike. This book analyses: how Hitler's intelligence staff misled him in a bid to outfox their Nazi Party rivals; the bureaucratic bungling behind Pearl Harbor; how in-fighting within American intelligence ensured they were taken off guard by the Viet Cong's 1968 Tet Offensive; how overconfidence, political interference and deception facilitated Egypt and Syria's 1973 surprise attack on Israel; why a handful of marines and a London taxicab were all Britain had to defend the Falklands; the mistaken intelligence that allowed Saddam Hussein to remain in power until the second Iraq War of 2003; the truth behind the US failure to run a terrorist warning system before the 9/11 WTC bombing; and how governments are increasingly pressurising intelligence agencies to 'spin' a party-political line.

In World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence, military historian James L. Gilbert provides an authoritative overview of the birth of modern Army intelligence. Following the natural division of the intelligence war, which was fought on both the home front and overseas, Gilbert traces the development and use of intelligence and counterintelligence through the eyes of their principal architects: General Dennis E. Nolan and Colonel Ralph Van Deman. Gilbert explores how on the home front, US Army counterintelligence faced both internal and external threats that began with the Army’s growing concerns over the loyalty of resident aliens who were being drafted into the ranks and soon evolved into the rooting out of enemy saboteurs and spies intent on doing great harm to America’s war effort. To achieve their goals, counterintelligence personnel relied upon major strides in the areas of code breaking and detection of secret inks. Overseas, the intelligence effort proved far more extensive in terms of resources and missions, even reaching into nearby neutral countries. Intelligence within the American Expeditionary Forces was heavily indebted to its Allied counterparts who not only provided an organizational blueprint but also veteran instructors and equipment needed to train newly arriving intelligence specialists. Rapid advances by American intelligence were also made possible by the appointment of competent leaders and the recruitment of highly motivated and skilled personnel; likewise, the Army’s decision to assign the bulk of its linguists to support intelligence proved critical. World War I would witness the linkage between intelligence and emerging technologies—from the use of cameras in aircraft to the intercept of enemy radio transmissions. Equally significant was the introduction of new intelligence disciplines—from exploitation of captured equipment to the translation of enemy documents. These and other functions that emerged from World War I would continue to the present to provide military intelligence with the essential tools necessary to support the Army and the nation. World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence is ideal not only for students and scholars of military history and World War I, but will also appeal to any reader interested in how modern intelligence operations first evolved.

Traditionally the military community held the intelligence profession in low esteem, spying was seen as dirty work and information was all to often ignored if it conflicted with a commander's own view. Handel examines the ways in which this situation has improved and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.

This biography of the Civil War officer who established the Union’s intelligence network “is an absolute treasure trove of . . . operational information” (Military History Magazine). In this biography of George H. Sharpe, acclaimed historian Peter Tsouras recounts the significance of Sharpe’s grand contribution to the Union war effort: the creation of an all-source intelligence operation known as the Bureau of Military Information. Tsouras contends that, under Sharpe’s leadership, the BMI was the combat multiplier that ultimately brought the Union to victory. By early 1863, in the two-and-half months before the Chancellorsville Campaign, Sharpe had compiled a thorough and accurate Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. His reports identified every brigade and its location in Lee’s army, provided an order-of-battle down to the regiment level, and a complete analysis of the railroad. Beyond this, Sharpe assembled a staff of thirty to fifty scouts and support personnel to run the military intelligence operation of the Army of the Potomac. He later supported Grant’s armies operating against Richmond during the Siege of Petersburg, where the BMI played a fundamental role in the victory. After the war, Sharpe became one of the most powerful Republican politicians in New York State, had close friendships with presidents Grant and Arthur, and was a champion of African American civil rights. With a wealth of newly discovered primary documents, including the diaries of Sharpe’s deputy John C. Babcock, Tsouras sheds significant new light on the evolution of Civil War intelligence reporting.

A masterly look at the value and limitations of intelligence in the conduct of war from the premier military historian of our time, John Keegan. Intelligence gathering is an immensely complicated and vulnerable endeavor. And it often fails. Until the invention of the telegraph and radio, information often traveled no faster than a horse could ride, yet intelligence helped defeat Napoleon. In the twentieth century, photo analysts didn’t recognize Germany’s V-2 rockets for what they were; on the other hand, intelligence helped lead to victory over the Japanese at Midway. In Intelligence in War, John Keegan illustrates that only when paired with force has military intelligence been an effective tool, as it may one day be in besting al-Qaeda.