This book is about what Airmen have in common - our heritage, capacity, and future potential. It also illustrates that while we're on the leading edge, we're also part of the sweep of military history. Understanding the way that our predecessors handled their challenges can equip us to better serve our nation. The number one aim of this book is to supply Airmen with useful thoughts that might help them meet their known responsibilities and the unknown challenges their service will bring. We can learn from both the failures and the successes of soldiers, sailors, marines, and Airmen; the ancient past; and yesterday's headlines. This book is a revision of one published in 1990. Just as in the 1990 edition, the quotations are arranged by subject matter to present multiple views of each topic.

This is a book of quotations and comments about air power, war, and military matters. But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them literally. Each selection presents a picture that you can look at again and again. Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's plans; they can make either an interesting multiple-view description of the subject or a puzzle. Even a hundred books couldn't give a complete picture of air power and war. What this book attempts to do is present a mosaic - a big, grainy picture of military air power that gains value as you step back from it and achieve perspective. And like a mosaic, this picture fills in only as you fit each piece with the others. Readers who are just embarking on a serious study of the military profession will find food for thought here; the more advanced student should find a feast. You are invited to read, reflect, enjoy, and appreciate, so you may apply your understanding when called to do so. Col. Dennis M. Drew, United States Air Force Director, Airpower Research Institute

This is a book of quotations and comments about air power, war, and military matters. But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them literally. Each selection presents a picture that you can look at again and again. Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's plans: they can make either an interesting multiple-view description of the subject or a puzzle. Even a hundred books couldn't give a complete picture of air power and war. What this book attempts to do is present a mosaic a big, grainy picture of military air power that gains value as you step back from it and achieve perspective. And like a mosaic, this picture fills in only as you fit each piece with the others.

This collection of essays reflects the proceedings of a 1991 conference on "The United States Air Force: Aerospace Challenges and Missions in the 1990s," sponsored by the USAF and Tufts University. The 20 contributors comment on the pivotal role of airpower in the war with Iraq and address issues and choices facing the USAF, such as the factors that are reshaping strategies and missions, the future role and structure of airpower as an element of US power projection, and the aerospace industry's views on what the Air Force of the future will set as its acquisition priorities and strategies. The authors agree that aerospace forces will be an essential and formidable tool in US security policies into the next century. The contributors include academics, high-level military leaders, government officials, journalists, and top executives from aerospace and defense contractors.

Colonel Westenhoff provides a collection of quotations about the utility and potential of airpower. The book is divided into the following sections: Airpower, War Technology, the Principles of War, and Command. This digest is organized to be a handy reference.

For nearly two decades the United States Air Force (USAF) oriented the bulk of its thinking, acquisition, planning, and training on the threat of a Soviet blitzkrieg across the inter German border. The Air Force fielded a powerful conventional arm well rehearsed in the tactics required to operate over a central European battlefield. Then, in a matter of days, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait altered key assumptions that had been developed over the previous decade and a half. The USAF faced a different foe employing a different military doctrine in an unexpected environment. Instead of disrupting a fast paced land offensive, the combat wings of the United States Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) were ordered to attack a large, well fortified, and dispersed Iraqi ground force. The heart of that ground force was the Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC). CENTAF's mission dictated the need to develop an unfamiliar repertoire of tactics and procedures to meet theater objectives. How effectively did CENTAF adjust air operations against the Republican Guard to the changing realities of combat? Answering that question is central to this study, and the answer resides in evaluation of the innovations developed by CENTAF to improve its operational and tactical performance against the Republican Guard. Effectiveness and timeliness are the primary criteria used for evaluating innovations.