Applying the new economics of organisation and relational theories of the firm to the problem of understanding cross-national variation in the political economy, this volume elaborates a new understanding of the institutional differences that characterise the 'varieties of capitalism' worldwide.

This book presents the main results of the OECD Innovation Microdata Project -- the first large-scale effort to exploit firm-level data from innovation surveys across 20 countries in an internationally harmonised way, with a view to addressing common analytical questions.

From workers' wages to presidential elections, labor unions once exerted tremendous clout in American life. In the immediate post-World War II era, one in three workers belonged to a union. The fraction now is close to one in five, and just one in ten in the private sector. The only thing big about Big Labor today is the scope of its problems. While many studies have explained the causes of this decline, What Unions No Longer Do shows the broad repercussions of labor's collapse for the American economy and polity. Organized labor was not just a minor player during the middle decades of the twentieth century, Jake Rosenfeld asserts. For generations it was the core institution fighting for economic and political equality in the United States. Unions leveraged their bargaining power to deliver benefits to workers while shaping cultural understandings of fairness in the workplace. What Unions No Longer Do details the consequences of labor's decline, including poorer working conditions, less economic assimilation for immigrants, and wage stagnation among African-Americans. In short, unions are no longer instrumental in combating inequality in our economy and our politics, resulting in a sharp decline in the prospects of American workers and their families.

In the twentieth century, large companies employing many workers formed the bedrock of the U.S. economy. Today, on the list of big business's priorities, sustaining the employer-worker relationship ranks far below building a devoted customer base and delivering value to investors. As David Weil's groundbreaking analysis shows, large corporations have shed their role as direct employers of the people responsible for their products, in favor of outsourcing work to small companies that compete fiercely with one another. The result has been declining wages, eroding benefits, inadequate health and safety protections, and ever-widening income inequality. From the perspectives of CEOs and investors, fissuring--splitting off functions that were once managed internally--has been phenomenally successful. Despite giving up direct control to subcontractors and franchises, these large companies have figured out how to maintain the quality of brand-name products and services, without the cost of maintaining an expensive workforce. But from the perspective of workers, this strategy has meant stagnation in wages and benefits and a lower standard of living. Weil proposes ways to modernize regulatory policies so that employers can meet their obligations to workers while allowing companies to keep the beneficial aspects of this business strategy.

Within Post-Keynesian economics there is a spectrum of approaches to theories of the firm but what they have in common, to their great benefit, is a proper integration of the concept of radical uncertainty: data that cannot be known. This book revisits Kalecki’s theory of the firm is located to show that it constitutes fertile theoretical ground on which to systematically understand the resultant indeterminacy when firms operate under conditions of radical uncertainty. The author proposes a way of generalising radical uncertainty by integrating some of the separate approaches within Post-Keynesian economics centred around Kalecki’s work. Through this, it is shown that radical uncertainty does more than just change the ultimate motivation of firms (dropping short run profit maximisation; more complex motivation; interconnectivity with the environment), it is central to the emergence, existence and motivation of firms, and critically also firm strategy. It is argued that firms do not simply respond to uncertainty: it is the systematic cause of their intentional behaviour. Through developing these arguments, the book also contributes to the methodology of Kalecki and Shackle, as well as Kaleckian price theory. This book will be important reading for anyone interested in theories of the firm, Post-Keynesian economics and heterodox approaches to economics more broadly.