The study of medieval warfare has developed enormously in recent years. The figure of the armoured mounted knight, who was believed to have materialized in Carolingian times, long dominated all discussion of the subject. It is now understood that the knight emerged over a long period of time and that he was never alone on the field of conflict. Infantry, at all times, played a substantial role in conflict, and the notion that they were in some way invented only in the fourteenth century is no longer sustainable. Moreover, modern writers have examined campaigns which for long seemed pointless because they did not lead to spectacular events like battles. As a result, we now understand the pattern of medieval war which often did not depend on battle but on exerting pressure on the opponent by economic warfare. This pattern was intensified by the existence of castles, and careful study has revealed much about their development and the evolving means of attacking them. Crusading warfare pitted westerners against a novel style of war and affords an opportunity to assess the military effectiveness of European methods. New areas of study are now developing. The logistics of medieval armies was always badly neglected, while until very recently there was a silence on the victims of war. Assembled in this volume are 31 papers which represent milestones in the development of the new ideas about medieval warfare, set in context by an introductory essay.

This text examines the nature of war in the period 1000-1300 A.D. and argues that is was primarily shaped by the people who conducted war - the landowners.

By the 11th century the French King had lost control of border regions, while local warfare had grown alarmingly frequent. In fact the energies of the French military élite were now focused on petty internal squabbles and external adventures like the Norman conquest of England. Nevertheless, the population and economy both expanded, although it was not until the 12th century that the crown rebuilt its power-base. Despite its slow start when compared with neighbours like England, the Kingdom of France had, by the 13th century, risen to become the most powerful state in Western Europe. This title describes the organisation, history and tactics of French medieval armies.

Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq. "In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."—Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly "This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics

First full-length study of the use and perception of deceit in medieval warfare. Deception and trickery are a universal feature of warfare, from the Trojan horse to the inflatable tanks of the Second World War. The wars of the Central Middle Ages (c. 1000-1320) were no exception. This book looks at the various tricks reported in medieval chronicles, from the Normans feigning flight at the battle of Hastings (1066) to draw the English off Senlac Hill, to the Turks who infiltrated the Frankish camp at the Field of Blood (1119) disguised as bird sellers, to the Scottish camp followers descending on the field of Bannockburn (1314) waving laundry as banners to mimic a division of soldiers. This study also considers what contemporary society thought about deception on the battlefield: was it a legitimate way to fight? Was cunning considered an admirable quality in a warrior? Were the culturally and religious "other" thought to be more deceitful in war than Western Europeans? Through a detailed analysis of vocabulary and narrative devices, this book reveals a society with a profound moral ambivalence towards military deception, in which authors were able to celebrate a warrior's cunning while simultaneously condemning their enemies for similar acts of deceit. It also includes an appendix cataloguing over four hundred incidents of military deception as recorded in contemporary chronicle narratives.

This volume brings together a series of articles by John France, published over a span of more than forty years, covering a number of aspects of the military and crusading history of the Middle Ages, both in Europe and the Near East. An interest in understanding how war worked and why informs a first group of articles, ranging from Carolingian armies to the organisation of war in the 13th century. The focus then turns to the Crusades, the most ambitious conquests of the era, with a set of studies on the First Crusade and others on the manner and conduct of warfare in the territories of the Latin East. The volume also includes a major unpublished analysis, co-authored with Nicholas Morton, of the problems faced by the local Islamic powers in the early Crusading period, reminding us that an army is only as strong as its enemies permit, and suggesting that the crusaders should be seen in this light.