In the eyes of many historians, Union general George B. McClellan single-handedly did more damage to the Union war effort than any other individual--including Confederate commander Robert E. Lee. Promoting his own ideas and career regardless of the consequences, McClellan eventually became a thorn in the side of President Lincoln. Removed from command on November 5, 1862, McClellan left a legacy of excessive caution that continued to affect the Army of the Potomac. From West Point to Antietam, this volume examines McClellan's army career and especially how his decisions affected the course of the Civil War. Union actions are examined in detail with special emphasis on the roles McClellan played--or did not play. Excerpts from McClellan's orders and correspondence provide a contemporary picture and motives for his actions. An appendix examines the treatment given McClellan by various historians.

As a result, Rafuse sheds light not only on McClellan's conduct on the battlefields of 1861-62 but on United States politics and culture in the years leading up to the Civil War.

In the eyes of many historians, Union general George B. McClellan single-handedly did more damage to the Union war effort than any other individual--including Confederate commander Robert E. Lee. Promoting his own ideas and career regardless of the consequences, McClellan eventually became a thorn in the side of President Lincoln. Removed from command on November 5, 1862, McClellan left a legacy of excessive caution that continued to affect the Army of the Potomac. From West Point to Antietam, this volume examines McClellan's army career and especially how his decisions affected the course of the Civil War. Union actions are examined in detail with special emphasis on the roles McClellan played--or did not play. Excerpts from McClellan's orders and correspondence provide a contemporary picture and motives for his actions. An appendix examines the treatment given McClellan by various historians.

There was no more remarkable pair in the Civil War than Abraham Lincoln and George McClellan. At only 35 years old, McClellan commanded the Ohio troops early in the war, and won skirmishes for the Union in western Virginia. After the disastrous Union defeat at Bull Run in the summer of 1861, Lincoln sent word for McClellan to come to Washington, and soon elevated him to commander-in-chief of the Union army. But in the late summer and fall of 1861, things took a turn for the worst. Meticulous in his planning and preparations, McClellan began to delay attacking the enemy and developed a penchant for vastly overestimating the Confederate forces he faced. All of this hampered his ability to lead an aggressive force in a fast-moving battlefield environment. Finally losing his patience, Lincoln was famously quoted as saying, "If General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it for a time." Lincoln and McClellan takes an in-depth look at this fascinating relationship, from the early days of the Civil War to the 1864 presidential election when McClellan ran against Lincoln on an anti-war platform and lost. Here, award-winning author John C. Waugh weaves a tale of hubris, paranoia, failure, and triumph, illuminating as never before this unique and complicated alliance.

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“Sears has finally unraveled the mystique of this complex, brilliant Civil War general . . . A fascinating story” (James M. McPherson, author of Battle Cry of Freedom). “Commander of the Northern army in the Civil War, Gen. George McClellan saw himself as God’s chosen instrument for saving the Union. Self-aggrandizing, with a streak of arrogant stubbornness, he set himself above President Lincoln, whom he privately called ‘the Gorilla.’ To ‘the young Napoleon,’ as McClellan’s troops dubbed him, abolition was an ‘accursed doctrine.’ Fond of conspiracy plots, he insisted that the Lincoln administration had traitorously conspired to set him up for military defeat. Although he constantly anticipated one big, decisive battle that would crush the South, he squandered one military opportunity after another, and, if Sears is correct, he was the worst strategist the Army of the Potomac ever had. Based on primary sources, letters, dispatch books, diaries, newspapers, this masterly biography is an astonishing portrait of an egotistical crank who could snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.” —Publishers Weekly “Engagingly written and thoroughly researched, Sears’s persuasive critique is the best and most complete biography of this controversial general.” —Library Journal “The best biography of McClellan ever published. Sears uses intensive research, including new material, to document the tormented, wasted military career of a talented man . . . The enigma of McClellan has never been explained so well . . . Historians should be grateful.” —The Washington Post Book World

Perhaps no other Union commander's legacy in the Civil War has been the subject of as much controversy as George B. McClellan's. Since the midpoint of this century, however, he has emerged as the complex general who, though gifted with administrative and organizational skills, was unable and unwilling to fight with the splendid army he had created. Thomas J. Rowland argues that this interpretation rests squarely within the context of general historical verdicts of the way in which the North eventually triumphed. Civil War scholars have found the quality of Union leadership in the early years of the war wanting, and that it was not until U.S. Grant and W.T. Sherman emerged that success was ensured. On the other hand, Grant and Sherman knew failure but were judged less harshly than was McClellan. In George B. McClellan and Civil War History, Rowland presents a framework in which early Civil War command can be viewed without direct comparison to that of the final two years.