Matrix Games, Programming, and Mathematical Economics deals with game theory, programming theory, and techniques of mathematical economics in a single systematic theory. The principles of game theory and programming are applied to simplified problems related to economic models, business decisions, and military tactics. The book explains the theory of matrix games and some of the tools used in the analysis of matrix games. The text describes optimal strategies for matrix games which have two basic properties, as well as the construction of optimal strategies. The book investigates the structure of sets of solutions of discrete matrix games, with emphasis on the class of games whose solutions are unique. The examples show the use of dominance concepts, symmetries, and probabilistic arguments that emphasize the principles of game theory. One example involves two opposing political parties in an election campaign, particularly, how they should distribute their advertising efforts for wider exposure. The text also investigates how to determine an optimal program from several choices that results with the maximum or minimum objective. The book also explores the analogs of the duality theorem, the equivalence of game problems to linear programming problems, and also the inter-industry nonlinear activity analysis model requiring special mathematical methods. The text will prove helpful for students in advanced mathematics and calculus. It can be appreciated by mathematicians, engineers, economists, military strategists, or statisticians who formulate decisions using mathematical analysis and linear programming.

Mathematical Methods and Theory in Games, Programming, and Economics, Volume II provides information pertinent to the mathematical theory of games of strategy. This book presents the mathematical tools for manipulating and analyzing large sets of strategies. Organized into nine chapters, this volume begins with an overview of the fundamental concepts in game theory, namely, strategy and pay-off. This text then examines the identification of strategies with points in Euclidean n-space, which is a convenience that simplifies the mathematical analysis. Other chapters provide a discussion of the theory of finite convex games. This book discusses as well the extension of the theory of convex continuous games to generalized convex games, which leads to the characterization that such games possess optimal strategies of finite type. The final chapter deals with the components of a simple two-person poker game. This book is a valuable resource for mathematicians, statisticians, economists, social scientists, and research workers.

This single-volume edition of a 2-volume set, discusses the theory of matrix games, linear and nonlinear programming, and mathematical economics while clarifying key mathematical concepts and demonstrates their applicability. 1959 edition.