The development of sustainable advanced nuclear fuel cycles is a long-term goal of the Office of Nuclear Energy's (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technologies program. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is supporting research and development (R & D) of advanced instrumentation, analysis tools, and integration methodologies to meet this goal (Miller, 2015). This advanced R & D is intended to facilitate safeguards and security by design of fuel cycle facilities. The lab-scale demonstration of a virtual facility, distributed test bed, that connects the individual tools being developed at National Laboratories and university research establishments, is a key program milestone for 2020. These tools will consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modeling, simulation and integration.

The development of sustainable advanced nuclear fuel cycles is a long-term goal of the Office of Nuclear Energy's (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technologies program. The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign is supporting research and development (R & D) of advanced instrumentation, analysis tools, and integration methodologies to meet this goal (Miller, 2015). This advanced R & D is intended to facilitate safeguards and security by design of fuel cycle facilities. The lab-scale demonstration of a virtual facility, distributed test bed, that connects the individual tools being developed at National Laboratories and university research establishments, is a key program milestone for 2020. These tools will consist of instrumentation and devices as well as computer software for modeling. To aid in framing its long-term goal, during FY16, a modeling and simulation roadmap is being developed for three major areas of investigation: (1) radiation transport and sensors, (2) process and chemical models, and (3) shock physics and assessments. For each area, current modeling approaches are described and gaps and needs are identified.

Simulations and experiments have been carried out to investigate advanced time-correlated measurement methods for characterizing and assaying nuclear material for safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle. These activities are part of a project studying advanced instrumentation techniques in support of the U.S. Department of Energy's Fuel Cycle Research and Development program and its Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program. For fiscal year 2011 work focused on examining the practical experimental aspects of using a time-tagged, associated-particle electronic neutron generator for interrogating low-enrichment uranium in combination with steady-state interrogation using a moderated 241Am-Li neutron source. Simulation work for the project involved the use of the MCNP-PoliMi Monte Carlo simulation tool to determine the relative strength and the time-of-flight energy spectra of different sample materials under irradiation. Work also took place to develop a post-processor parser code to extract comparable data from the MCNP5 & 6 codes. Experiments took place using a commercial deuterium-tritium associated-particle electronic neutron generator to irradiate a number of uranium-bearing material samples. Time-correlated measurements of neutron and photon signatures of these measurements were made using five liquid scintillator detectors in a novel array, using high-speed waveform digitizers for data collection. This report summarizes the experiments that took place in FY2011, presents preliminary analyses that have been carried out to date for a subpart of these experiments, and describes future activities planned in this area. The report also describes support Idaho National Laboratory gave to Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2011 to facilitate 2-dimensional imagery of mixed-oxide fuel pins for safeguards applications as a part of the MPACT program.

The subject of this report is domestic safeguards and security by design (2SBD) for high-temperature gas reactors, focusing on material control and accountability (MC & A). The motivation for the report is to provide 2SBD support to the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) project, which was launched by Congress in 2005. This introductory section will provide some background on the NGNP project and an overview of the 2SBD concept. The remaining chapters focus specifically on design aspects of the candidate high-temperature gas reactors (HTGRs) relevant to MC & A, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements, and proposed MC & A approaches for the two major HTGR reactor types: pebble bed and prismatic. Of the prismatic type, two candidates are under consideration: (1) GA's GT-MHR (Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor), and (2) the Modular High-Temperature Reactor (M-HTR), a derivative of Areva's Antares reactor. The future of the pebble-bed modular reactor (PBMR) for NGNP is uncertain, as the PBMR consortium partners (Westinghouse, PBMR [Pty] and The Shaw Group) were unable to agree on the path forward for NGNP during 2010. However, during the technology assessment of the conceptual design phase (Phase 1) of the NGNP project, AREVA provided design information and technology assessment of their pebble bed fueled plant design called the HTR-Module concept. AREVA does not intend to pursue this design for NGNP, preferring instead a modular reactor based on the prismatic Antares concept. Since MC & A relevant design information is available for both pebble concepts, the pebble-bed HTGRs considered in this report are: (1) Westinghouse PBMR; and (2) AREVA HTR-Module. The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) sponsors the Fuel Cycle Research and Development program (FCR & D), which contains an element specifically focused on the domestic (or state) aspects of SBD. This Material Protection, Control and Accountancy Technology (MPACT) program supports the present work summarized in this report, namely the development of guidance to support the consideration of MC & A in the design of both pebble-bed and prismatic-fueled HTGRs. The objective is to identify and incorporate design features into the facility design that will cost effectively aid in making MC & A more effective and efficient, with minimum impact on operations. The theft of nuclear material is addressed through both MC & A and physical protection, while the threat of sabotage is addressed principally through physical protection.