This book, first published in 1986, argues that there is a special category of medium powers in the world – such as Britain, France, India, Brazil, Japan, China and others – which have sufficient military power to do something to protect their interests but which are not a match for the superpowers. It surveys the whole range of naval warfare – equipment, operations, organisation and deployment – and discusses how each item should be tailored by the recognition of the position of the medium power. It considers alliances, a key element for medium powers, and explores how these should be handled and what use they may be expected to fulfil. The book argues that the concept of medium power, here developed thoroughly for the first time, will be extremely useful to many countries in defining their strategic role in a purposeful way.

This book, first published in 1986, argues that there is a special category of medium powers in the world – such as Britain, France, India, Brazil, Japan, China and others – which have sufficient military power to do something to protect their interests but which are not a match for the superpowers. It surveys the whole range of naval warfare – equipment, operations, organisation and deployment – and discusses how each item should be tailored by the recognition of the position of the medium power. It considers alliances, a key element for medium powers, and explores how these should be handled and what use they may be expected to fulfil. The book argues that the concept of medium power, here developed thoroughly for the first time, will be extremely useful to many countries in defining their strategic role in a purposeful way.

A collection of essays on British and American maritime relationships in the 20th century together with details on the British organization of warfare, Anglo-American maritime theory, their rivalries and coalitions and their plans for dealing with a future war in the nuclear age.

A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy is a deliberately compact introductory work aimed at junior seafarers, those who make decisions affecting the sea services, and those who educate seafarers and decision-makers. It introduces readers to the main theoretical ideas that shape how statesmen and commanders make and execute maritime strategy in times of peace and war. Following in the spirit of Bernard Brodie's Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy, a World War II-era book whose title makes its purpose plain, it will be a companion volume to such works as Geoffrey Till's Seapower and Wayne Hughes's Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, the classic treatise that explains how to handle navies in fleet actions. It takes the mystery out of maritime strategy, which should not be an arcane art for practitioners or policy-makers, and will help the next generation think about strategy.

This book focuses on the theory and practice of maritime strategy and operations by the weaker powers at sea. Illustrated by examples from naval and military history, the book explains and analyzes the strategies of the weaker side at sea in both peacetime and wartime; in defense versus offense; the main prerequisites for disputing control of the sea; and the conceptual framework of disputing control of the sea. It also explains and analyzes in some detail the main methods of disputing sea control – avoiding/seeking decisive encounters, weakening enemy naval forces over time, counter-containment of enemy naval forces, destroying the enemy’s military-economic potential at sea, attacks on the enemy coast, defense of the coast, defense/capturing important positions/basing areas, and defense/capturing of a choke point. A majority of the world’s navies are currently of small or medium-size. In the case of a war with a much stronger opponent, they would be strategically on the defensive, and their main objective then would be to dispute control of the sea by a stronger side at sea. This book provides a practical guide to such a strategy. This book would be of much interest to students of naval power, maritime security, strategic studies and military/naval history.

This book argues that the UK, as a post-modern globalised state, will require means to have influence over events and opponents that threaten the UK's interests in the 21st century, and that its means is the Royal Navy. However, unlike other studies, this research emphasizes the role of logistics, especially afloat support logistics and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. In doing so, the author rejects the current theory underpinning military operations at distance, that distance degrades capability, and posits an alternative theory, that time is the key factor, for maritime-based forces. The UK must reengage with its maritime status and maintain a maritime-based capability to protect its interests in the new maritime century as a leader within the international community. The book will be of use to scholars and researchers interested in naval history and defence policy.