When can the Executive manipulate the composition of a Court? What political factors explain judicial instability on the bench? Using original field data from Argentina's National Supreme Court and all twenty-four Provincial Supreme Courts, Andrea Castagnola develops a novel theory to explain forced retirements of judges. She argues that in developing democracies the political benefits of manipulating the court outweigh the costs associated with doing so. The instability of the political context and its institutions causes politicians to focus primarily on short-term goals and to care mostly about winning elections. Consequently, judiciaries become a valuable tool for politicians to have under their control. Contrary to the predictions of strategic retirement theory, Castagnola demonstrates that there are various institutional and non-institutional mechanisms for induced retirement which politicians have used against justices, regardless of the amount of support their party has in Congress. The theoretical innovations contained herein shed much needed light on the existing literature on judicial politics and democratization. Even though the political manipulation of courts is a worldwide phenomenon, previous studies have shown that Argentina is the theory-generating case for studying manipulation of high courts.

This is the first focused study on the relationship between the use of national courts to pursue retrospective justice and the construction of viable democracies. Included in this interdisciplinary volume are fascinating, detailed essays on the experiences of eight countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and South Africa. According to the contributors, the most important lesson for leaders of new democracies, who are wrestling with the human rights abuses of past dictatorships, is that they have many options. Democratizing regimes are well-advised to be attentive to the significant political, ethical, and legal constraints that may limit their ability to achieve retribution for past wrongs. On prudential ground alone, some fledgling regimes will have no choice but to restrain their desire for punishment in the interest of political survival. However, it would be incorrect to think that all new democracies are therefore bereft of the political and legal resources needed to bring the perpetrators of egregious human rights violations to justice. In many instances, governments have overcome the obstacles before them and, by appealing to both national and international legal standards, have brought their former dictators to trial. When these judicial proceedings have been properly conducted and insulated from partisan political pressures, they have provided tangible evidence of the guiding principles-equality, fairness, and the rule of law-that are essential to the post-authoritarian order. This collection shows that the quest for transitional justice has amounted to something more than merely a break with the past--it constitutes a formative act which directly affects the quality and credibility of democratic institutions.

This book illuminates how law and politics interact in the judicial doctrines and explores how democracy sustains and is sustained by the exercise of judicial power.

During the last two decades the judiciary has come to play an increasingly important political role in Latin America. Constitutional courts and supreme courts are more active in counterbalancing executive and legislative power than ever before. At the same time, the lack of effective citizenship rights has prompted ordinary people to press their claims and secure their rights through the courts. This collection of essays analyzes the diverse manifestations of the judicialization of politics in contemporary Latin America, assessing their positive and negative consequences for state-society relations, the rule of law, and democratic governance in the region. With individual chapters exploring Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela, it advances a comparative framework for thinking about the nature of the judicialization of politics within contemporary Latin American democracies.

This book argues that independent courts can defend democracy by encouraging political elites to more prudently exercise their powers.