During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

Material taken from the conference panel and discussion titled: What should we have done differently?

Pursuant to Title V of Public Law 102-25, the Department of Defense has prepared this Interim Report on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict. This report reflects many of the preliminary impressions formed by the Department since the cessation of hostilities. However, much of the technical information needed for sound analysis is still being collected. The final report of the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command has not yet been completed. Nonetheless, it is possible to describe some of the key events that occurred in this conflict and to identify preliminary some lessons to be learned. The Department of Defense will continue to study the lessons of the war and will submit a final Report in accordance with Title V in January 1992.

Includes responses to 26 questions asked by the Congress, including: military objectives, military strategy, deployment of troops, use of special operations forces, employment and performance of U.S. military equipment, logistics support, acquisitions policy, personnel management, role of women, effectiveness of reserves, intelligence and counterintelligence, environmental terrorism, rules of engagement, C3 operations, rules of engagement, media policies and procedures, use of deception, preparedness, number of military and civilian casualties, acquisition of foreign military technology from Iraq, and more. Glossary and map.