Examines the political history of administrative reform undertaken by 20th-century presidents. Attempting to explain the growth of modern bureaucracy within an 18th-century framework and the expansion of presidential control over administrative powers, the author explores the relationship between administrative theory and the dilemmas posed for a developing administrative state by the separation of powers. He also looks at and compares successive cases of presidentially initiated comprehensive reform planning, in order to understand the implications for the president's institutional role. Paper edition (unseen), $25.00. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

The first book to explore the tension between presidents and federal agencies from the perspective of careerists in the executive branch. Winner of the Herbert A. Simon Book Award of the American Political Science Association Why do presidents face so many seemingly avoidable bureaucratic conflicts? And why do these clashes usually intensify toward the end of presidential administrations, when a commander-in-chief’s administrative goals tend to be more explicit and better aligned with their appointed leadership’s prerogatives? In Rethinking the Administrative Presidency, William G. Resh considers these complicated questions from an empirical perspective. Relying on data drawn from surveys and interviews, Resh rigorously analyzes the argument that presidents typically start from a premise of distrust when they attempt to control federal agencies. Focusing specifically on the George W. Bush administration, Resh explains how a lack of trust can lead to harmful agency failure. He explores the extent to which the Bush administration was able to increase the reliability—and reduce the cost—of information to achieve its policy goals through administrative means during its second term. Arguing that President Bush's use of the administrative presidency hindered trust between appointees and career executives to deter knowledge sharing throughout respective agencies, Resh also demonstrates that functional relationships between careerists and appointees help to advance robust policy. He employs a “joists vs. jigsaws” metaphor to stress his main point: that mutual support based on optimistic trust is a more effective managerial strategy than fragmentation founded on unsubstantiated distrust.

As the scope and size of the U.S. government has expanded, the importance of good management to the success of a presidency has also increased. Although good management cannot guarantee political or policy success, poor management can certainly undermine good policy and political efforts. In this second edition of The Managerial Presidency James P. Pfiffner brings together both classic analyses and more recent treatments of managerial issues that affect the presidency. Some of the foremost presidency scholars have contributed to this volume, including Richard Neustadt, Charles O. Jones, Hugh Heclo, George Edwards, and Louis Fisher. This second edition includes more recent scholarship by Roger Porter, Steven Kelman, Peri Arnold, and Ronald Moe. The focus of this collection is the extent to which presidents can exercise control over the executive branch bureaucracies and whether it is wise for them to exert that control. Part one deals with the question of how to organize the White House staff. If this organizational problem is not resolved, solving the broader problems of organization and policy will be that much more difficult. Part two addresses the question of how much control presidents should exert over the departments and agencies of the executive branch and how the White House staff and other political appointees relate to career civil servants. The final section examines presidential managerial reform efforts and the congressional role in managing the government. Although the contributors to this collection do not all agree on how the presidency should be managed, there is surprising consensus on which questions ought to be asked. The analyses addressing those questions will be of interest to students and scholars of the modern presidency as well as those interested in executive leadership and public administration.

Failure should not be an option in the presidency, but for too long it has been the norm. From the botched attempt to rescue the U.S. diplomats held hostage by Iran in 1980 under President Jimmy Carter and the missed intelligence on Al Qaeda before 9-11 under George W. Bush to, most recently, the computer meltdown that marked the arrival of health care reform under Barack Obama, the American presidency has been a profile in failure. In Why Presidents Fail and How They Can Succeed Again, Elaine Kamarck surveys these and other recent presidential failures to understand why Americans have lost faith in their leaders—and how they can get it back. Kamarck argues that presidents today spend too much time talking and not enough time governing, and that they have allowed themselves to become more and more distant from the federal bureaucracy that is supposed to implement policy. After decades of "imperial" and "rhetorical" presidencies, we are in need of a "managerial" president. This White House insider and former Harvard academic explains the difficulties of governing in our modern political landscape, and offers examples and recommendations of how our next president can not only recreate faith in leadership but also run a competent, successful administration.

In a period of American history marked by congressional primacy, presidential passivity, and hostility to governmental action, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson became iconic presidents through activist leadership. Peri Arnold, a leading presidential scholar, goes beyond the biographers to explain what really set Roosevelt apart from his predecessor William McKinley, how Wilson differed from his successor Warren G. Harding, and how we might better understand the forgettable William Howard Taft in between. This is the first comparative study of the three Progressive Era presidents, examining the context in which they served, the evolving institutional role of the presidency, and the personal characteristics of each man. Arnold explains why Roosevelt and Wilson pursued activist roles, how they gained the means for effective leadership in a role that had not previously supported it, and how each of the three negotiated the choppy crosscurrents of changing institutions and politics with entirely different outcomes. Arnold delineates the American political scene at the turn of the twentieth century, one characterized by a weakening of party organizations, the rise of interest groups and print media, and increasing demands for reform. He shows how the Progressive Era presidents marked a transition from the nineteenth century's checks and balances to the twentieth's expansive presidential role, even though demands for executive leadership were at odds with the presidency's means to take independent action. Each of these presidents was uniquely challenged to experiment with the office's new potential for political independence from party and Congress, and Arnold explains how each had to justify their authority for such experimentation. He also shows how their actions were reflected in specific policy case studies: the Northern Trust and naval modernization under Roosevelt, tariff reform and the Pinchot/Ballinger debate over conservation under Taft, and the Federal Reserve and Federal Trade Commission under Wilson. Ultimately, Arnold shows how the period's ferment affected both the presidency and its incumbents and how they in turn affected progressive politics. More important, he helps us better understand two presidents who continue to inspire politicians of differing stripes and relates their leadership styles to the modern development of the presidency.

With its creation of the U.S. Bureau of Efficiency in 1916, Congress sought to bring the principles of "scientific management" to the federal government. Although this first staff agency in the executive branch lasted only a relatively short time, it was the first central agency in the federal government dedicated to improving the management of the executive branch. Mordecai Lee offers both a chronological history of the agency and a thematic treatment of the structure, staffing, and work processes of the bureau; its substantive activities; and its effects on the development of both the executive and the legislative branches. Charged with conducting management and policy analyses at the direction of the president, this bureau presaged the emergence of the activist and modern executive branch. The Bureau of Efficiency was also the first legislative branch agency, ushering in the large administrative infrastructure that now supports the policy-making and program oversight roles of Congress. The Bureau of Efficiency's assistance to presidents foreshadowed the eventual change in the role of the president vis-a-vis Congress; it helped upend the separation of powers doctrine by giving the modern executive the management tools for preeminence over the legislative branch.