Fighting the Fleet recognizes that fleets conduct four distinct but interlocking tasks at the operational level of war--striking, screening, scouting, and basing--and that successful operational art is achieved when they are brought to bear in a cohesive, competitive scheme. In explaining these elements and how they are conjoined for advantage, a central theme emerges: despite the utility and importance of jointness among the armed forces, the effective employment of naval power requires a specialized language and understanding of naval concepts that is often diluted or completely lost when too much jointness is introduced. Woven into the fabric of the book are the fundamental principles of three of the most important naval theorists of the twentieth century: Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, and Captain Wayne Hughes. While Cares and Cowden advocate the reinvigoration of combat theory and the appropriate use of operations research, they avoid over-theorizing and have produced a practical guide that empowers fleet planners to wield naval power appropriately and effectively in meeting today's operational and tactical challenges.

This new volume provides a comprehensive analysis of both the theory and practice of operational warfare at sea. The book is unique in using diverse sources and examples to present a comprehensive topical description and analysis of the key components of operational warfare at sea today. It opens with a survey of the emergence of operational warfare at sea since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, going on describe and analyze the objectives of naval warfare at the operational level and methods of employment of naval forces for accomplishing these objectives. The book explains the specifics of operational functions in a maritime theatre, discusses the personality traits and professional education required for successful naval operational commanders, and explores naval operational command and control in both peacetime and war, closing with predictions for the future of operational warfare at sea. This book serves as a primer of how to plan, prepare and execute major naval operations and campaigns for naval commanders and their staffs, but will also be of interest to advanced students of naval history, strategic studies and military history in general.

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Americans think of the Korean War as death and hardship in the bitter hills of Korea. It was certainly this, and for those who fought this is what they generally saw. Yet every foot of the struggles forward, every step of the retreats, the overwhelming victories, the withdrawals and last ditch stands had their seagoing support and overtones. The spectacular ones depended wholly on amphibious power -- the capability of the twentieth century scientific Navy to overwhelm land-bound forces at the point of contact. Yet the all pervading influence of the sea was present even when no major landing or retirement or reinforcement highlighted its effect. When navies clash in gigantic battle or hurl troops ashore under irresistible concentration of ship-borne guns and planes, nations understand that sea power is working. It is not so easy to understand that this tremendous force may effect its will silently, steadily, irresistibly even though no battles occur. No clearer example exists of this truth in wars dark record than in Korea. Communist-controlled North Korea had slight power at sea except for Soviet mines. So beyond this strong underwater phase the United States Navy and allies had little opposition on the water. It is, therefore, easy to fail to recognize the decisive role navies played in this war fought without large naval battles.

Sea mines have been important in naval warfare throughout history and continue to be so today. They have caused major damage to naval forces, slowed or stopped naval actions and commercial shipping, and forced the alteration of strategic and tactical plans. The threat posed by sea mines continues, and is increasing, in today's world of inexpensive advanced electronics, nanotechnology, and multiple potential enemies, some of which are difficult to identify. This report assesses the Department of the Navy's capabilities for conducting naval mining and countermining sea operations.

Modern marketing and advertising deeply influence the way we in which perceive the world and define our identity. Yet many of today's marketing and advertising practices are themselves products of earlier times. The development of brands, of advertising techniques and modern retailing are all associated with economic and business development of earlier periods. This collection of essays considers the emergence of modern marketing by examining product differentiation and brand creation, distribution and retailing strategies as well as advertising in a range of case studies covering the United States, Continental Europe and the United Kingdom. It highlights important innovations in marketing whilst underlining some surprising continuities, and is a valuable reference for undergraduate and postgraduate students of marketing and advertising.