Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.

At publication date, a free ebook version of this title will be available through Luminos, University of California Press’s Open Access publishing program. Visit www.luminosoa.org to learn more. China’s relation to Taiwan has been in constant contention since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and the creation of the defeated Kuomintang (KMT) exile regime on the island two months later. The island’s autonomous sovereignty has continually been challenged, initially because of the KMT’s insistence that it continue to represent not just Taiwan but all of China—and later because Taiwan refused to cede sovereignty to the then-dominant power that had arisen on the other side of the Taiwan Strait. One thing that makes Taiwan so politically difficult and yet so intellectually fascinating is that it ­­is not merely a security problem, but a ganglion of interrelated puzzles. The optimistic hope of the Ma Ying-jeou administration for a new era of peace and cooperation foundered on a landslide victory by the Democratic Progressive Party, which has made clear its intent to distance Taiwan from China’s political embrace. The Taiwanese are now waiting with bated breath as the relationship tautens. Why did détente fail, and what chance does Taiwan have without it? Contributors to this volume focus on three aspects of the evolving quandary: nationalistic identity, social economy, and political strategy.

The Taiwan issue has always been a core national interest of mainland China, which has steadfastly vowed to fulfill national reunification. This book provides a comprehensive and updated explanation of the strategic motivations, behavioral logic, and policymaking rationale of Beijing’s Taiwan policy. It will aid readers in predicting the future development of cross-Strait relations, reducing the risk of strategic miscalculations, and defusing potential geostrategic perils. The book analyzes Beijing’s changing policy toward Taiwan during the Kuomintang and Democratic Progressive Party administrations. It explains the key driving forces for Beijing’s Taiwan policy in these different periods, which have displayed fundamental shifts from confrontation to cooperation and then back to confrontation. The book also delves into how the rising strategic rivalry between China and the US may influence Beijing’s Taiwan policy and the prospect of cross-Strait relations in the near future. The book will be a useful reference to deepen intellectual understanding of Beijing’s broader security and diplomatic policies. It will also appeal to government policymakers who have a keen and vested interest in peace and security in the West Pacific.