Edited by William Alexander, Jeffrey M. Davis, Liam P. Ebrill, and Carl-Johan Lindgren, this volume discusses cross-country restructuring experiences building on the foundation laid by its predecessor Band Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy. It discusses broad principles and actions to guide policy makers in restructuring their banking systems.

Tiivistelmä.

Tiivistelmä.

Systemic bank restructing aims to improve bank performance - that is, restore solvency and profitability, improve the banking system's capacity to provide financial intermediation between savers and borrowers, and restore public confidence. The authors of this studyanalyzed the experiences of 24 countries that initiated reforms in the1980s and early 1990s.

In recent decades, a wide range of countries have experienced banking problems. Their approaches to systemic bank restructuring have varied substantially. This paper analyzes a representative sample of 24 countries and provides a summary of policies judged to be successful. The sample countries were ranked by relative progress in resolving banking sector problems. Based on this ranking, the paper examines the effectiveness of institutional and regulatory measures, assesses the impact of accompanying macroeconomic policies, and examines the extent to which particular restructuring instruments contributed to success. Special emphasis is given to the role of the central bank.

Systemic bank restructuring must be the responsibility of one government authority only, with other authorities providing support and analytical help. The restructuring authority, whose tasks are enumerated and discussed, should preferably be a separate and temporary agency reporting to the finance ministry. Other solutions are possible but not recommended. Parliament should be involved in setting priorities and supervising the process, but political interference in restructuring operations should be avoided. Practical issues to consider include ensuring efficient cooperation between authorities; the arrangement of problem asset workout and recovery; and restructuring of politically sensitive enterprises.

Governments frequently assist troubled banks. This paper examines the fiscal aspects of such assistance: rationale, design criteria, methods, and macroeconomic implications. It concludes that (1) banks should be assisted only when there is a clear systemic risk; (2) assistance should be tied to a comprehensive restructuring program, minimize fiscal cost, be equitable and transparent, prevent recurrence, and facilitate a sound macroeconomic environment; (3) debt-based assistance will worsen public sector debt sustainability and will probably increase aggregate demand; and (4) assistance may require a substantial fiscal response (especially given the possible need for a looser monetary stance), which should feed iteratively into the choice of restructuring strategy.