Motivation in Public Management: The Call of Public Service joins a long-standing debate about what drives the behavior of government employees and others who are engaged in the public's business. For many centuries, public service was considered a noble calling and, more recently, a profession. During the latter part of the 20th century, however, many scholars called into question both the reality and desirability of a public service ethic. This book draws upon a substantial and growing body of evidence from across disciplines in the social, behavioral, and natural sciences. It asks and answers key questions about the extent to which behavior is fundamentally self- or other-regarding. To paraphrase James Madison, 'public servants are not angels,' but neither are they self-aggrandizing opportunists. The evidence presented in this volume offers a compelling case that motivation theory should be grounded not only in rational choice models, but altruistic and prosocial perspectives as well. In addition to reviewing evidence from many disciplines, the volume extensively reviews research in public management conducted under the rubric of 'public service motivation'. The volume is a comprehensive guide to history, methodology, empirical research, and institutional and managerial implications of research on public service motivation. As the contributors illustrate, the implications transcend particular sectors or countries.

"Every once in a while somebody has to get the bureaucracy by the neck and shake it loose and say, 'Stop doing what you're doing.'" —Ronald Reagan How did senior career civil servants react to Ronald Reagan's attempt to redirect policy and increase presidential control over the bureaucracy? What issues molded their reactions? What motivates civil servants in general? How should they be managed and how do they affect federal policies? To answer these questions, Marissa Martino Golden offers us a glimpse into the world of our federal agencies. What Motivates Bureaucrats? tells the story of a group of upper-level career civil servants in the Reagan administration at the Environmental Protection Agency, the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division, the Food and Nutrition Service, and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The book reveals that most career civil servants were usually responsive to executive direction—even with a president attempting to turn agency policy 180 degrees from its past orientation. By delving deeply into the particular details of Reagan's intervention into the affairs of upper-level career civil servants, Golden also fulfills her broader mission of improving our understanding of bureaucratic behavior in general, explaining why the bureaucracy is controllable and highlighting the limits of that control.

This cutting-edge Research Handbook brings together international scholars to provide a comprehensive overview of motivation within and beyond the field of public administration. Discussing the implications of contemporary research for theory and practice, it offers suggestions for the development of future research in the field.

Winner of the Herbert A. Simon Book Award of the American Political Science Association, American Society for Public Administration Book Award of the American Society for Public Administration Political scientists and public administration scholars have long recognized that innovation in public agencies is contingent on entrepreneurial bureaucratic executives. But unlike their commercial counterparts, public administration “entrepreneurs” do not profit from their innovations. What motivates enterprising public executives? How are they created? Manuel P. Teodoro’s theory of bureaucratic executive ambition explains why pioneering leaders aren not the result of serendipity, but rather arise out of predictable institutional design. Teodoro explains the systems that foster or frustrate entrepreneurship among public executives. Through case studies and quantitative analysis of original data, he shows how psychological motives and career opportunities shape administrators’ decisions, and he reveals the consequences these choices have for innovation and democratic governance. Tracing the career paths and political behavior of agency executives, Teodoro finds that, when advancement involves moving across agencies, ambitious bureaucrats have strong incentives for entrepreneurship. Where career advancement occurs vertically within a single organization, ambitious bureaucrats have less incentive for innovation, but perhaps greater accountability. This research introduces valuable empirical methods and has already generated additional studies. A powerful argument for the art of the possible, Bureaucratic Ambition advances a flexible theory of politics and public administration. Its lessons will enrich debate among scholars and inform policymakers and career administrators.