A liner conference, as a self-regulation organisational form of liner shipping companies, constitutes a typical "hard-core cartel" with significant anti-competitive effect. One of the main three trade routes of liner shipping traffic is the Europe-Asia Trade, on the two ends of which both the European Community (EC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) play important roles in the international liner shipping market. However, the competition regimes on liner conferences in both jurisdictions are not equivalent. From a comparative point of view, this book reviews the historical development of maritime policy and regulatory legislation in the EC and the PRC, catches insight into the system of regulation regime and individual provisions in substantive and procedural meaning, and finally provides a wide-ranging perspective on the future competition regulation in respect of the latest developments in both jurisdictions.

As of October 2008, liner shipping companies lose their privileged status under EU competition law due to withdrawal of the liner conference block exemption, which generously authorized horizontal price-fixing and similar agreements between liner shipping companies. Where the liner consortia block exemption does not apply, all cooperative activity should be carefully and individually assessed under the competition provisions of the EC Treaty. Alla Pozdnakova has taken this opportunity to research and write an in-depth study of competition law problems in the liner shipping context. Her analysis is not only the first to examine the new European regime, and thus the most up-to-date study of the subject; it is in fact the first major independent study of how Articles 81 and 82 EC are construed and applied to the market conduct of liner shipping companies. In particular, the author addresses the following legal questions: * Does cooperation between liner shipping companies infringe Article 81(1) even if it does not entail hard-core restrictions of competition? * Can a cooperative arrangement between liner shipping companies claim that the efficiencies they produce outweigh the negative impact on competition (Article 81(3))? * When do certain market strategies of liner carriers become an abuse of a collective or individual dominant position (Article 82)? * Does parallel pricing behaviour infringe EC Treaty competition rules? Systematically, the author considers various market strategies of liner shipping companies and tests them as to their compatibility with EC Treaty competition provisions. In doing so, she thoroughly analyses European Commission decisions and judgments of the European courts, applying them authoritatively to the liner shipping sector. In this way, her book provides a well-structured account that clearly identifies the legal issues that liner shipping companies are likely to face once the special treatment traditionally allowed them is withdrawn. A summary of current and prospective developments in EU competition regulation and policy in liner shipping rounds up the analysis. Liner Shipping and EU Competition Law will be a unique and powerful resource for practitioners and policymakers as liner shipping companies restructure their agreements and market strategies to accommodate loss of the block exemption. It is also sure to become a definitive analysis of the legal identity of the liner shipping market sector under European competition law.

Purpose of this study is to establish whether or not it is necessary to exempt liner conferences from the regular mechanisms of European competition law by means of a group exemption. The main proposition of the author is that there is no need to allow liner conferences to engage in joint price fixing activities, with the consequence, that the corresponding exemption should be terminated. A first argument to that effect is that liner conferences constitute oligopolies and are harmful from an economic point of view. Secondly, the author concludes from an interpretation of the requirements laid down in Art. 81 III EC that the block exemption for liner conferences embodied in Art. 3 Regulation 4056/86 cannot be reconciled with the EC Treaty. Finally, the author looks at recent changes in U.S. antitrust policy on the issue of price fixing in the liner shipping industry as an aid to develop a future strategy for the European legislator on the issue of liner conferences.

In twenty years, the globalization of trade has led to a change in scale that has upset the balance of power between the players in online containerized maritime transport and the logistics chain passing through European seaports. Three global shipping alliances dominate 90% of online containerized maritime transport, while further integrating port activities. Twelve Asian ports, eight of which are Chinese, are now among the top fifteen in the world. At the same time, Chinese interests, supported by public authorities and resources, are taking control of terminals and port companies in Europe, as part of the geopolitical project of the New Silk Roads. This economic and industrial context is emblematic of the challenges facing European competition law, which has so far accompanied rather than controlled these transformations. European competition rules will have to be mobilized in a global context, alongside the new rules on the control of foreign direct investment. This study takes stock of the new regulatory challenges in this sector of prime importance for the Union.