This book presents an account of war settlement in Georgia and Tajikistan as local actors maneuvered in the shadow of a Russian-led military intervention. Combining ethnography and game theory and quantitative and qualitative methods, this book presents a revisionist account of the post-Soviet wars and their settlement.

The USSR’s dissolution resulted in the creation of not only fifteen recognized states but also of four non-recognized statelets: Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. Their polities comprise networks with state-like elements. Since the early 1990s, the four pseudo-states have been continously dependent on their sponsor countries (Russia, Armenia), and contesting the territorial integrity of their parental nation-states Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. In 2014, the outburst of Russia-backed separatism in Eastern Ukraine led to the creation of two more para-states, the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), whose leaders used the experience of older de facto states. In 2020, this growing network of de facto states counted an overall population of more than 4 million people. The essays collected in this volume address such questions as: How do post-Soviet de facto states survive and continue to grow? Is there anything specific about the political ecology of Eastern Europe that provides secessionism with the possibility to launch state-making processes in spite of international sanctions and counteractions of their parental states? How do secessionist movements become embedded in wider networks of separatism in Eastern and Western Europe? What is the impact of secessionism and war on the parental states? The contributors are Jan Claas Behrends, Petra Colmorgen, Bruno Coppieters, Nataliia Kasianenko, Alice Lackner, Mikhail Minakov, and Gwendolyn Sasse.

Though informed by case studies conducted in Ukraine, this book transcends its country-specific scope. It explains why informality in governance is not necessarily transitory or temporary but a constant in most political systems. The book discusses self-protective mechanisms, responses to incomplete or unfocused policy making, and strategies employed by individuals, classes, and communities to respond to unusual demands. The book argues that when state or company expectations exceed normative behavior, informal behavior continues to thrive. New tactics help cope with the reality of governance. Informality also challenges the values imposed by power through attitudes and behaviors that take place "beyond" or "in spite of" the state.

Why do new, democratizing states often find it so difficult to actually govern? Why do they so often fail to provide their beleaguered populations with better access to public goods and services? Using original and unusual data, this book uses post-communist Russia as a case in examining what the author calls this broader 'weak state syndrome' in many developing countries. Through interviews with over 800 Russian bureaucrats in 72 of Russia's 89 provinces, and a highly original database on patterns of regional government non-compliance to federal law and policy, the book demonstrates that resistance to Russian central authority not so much ethnically based (as others have argued) as much as generated by the will of powerful and wealthy regional political and economic actors seeking to protect assets they had acquired through Russia's troubled transition out of communism.

Having won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections, the Hungarian political party Fidesz removed many of the institutional obstacles of exerting power. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. In a new approach the author characterizes the system as the ?organized over-world?, the ?state employing mafia methods? and the ?adopted political family', applying these categories not as metaphors but elements of a coherent conceptual framework. The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are closely aligned with the interests of power and wealth concentrated in the hands of a small group of insiders. While the traditional mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of influence by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The innovative conceptual framework of the book is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules. ÿ

The collapse of the Soviet Union has engendered one of the most momentous and critical regional transformations of our times through formation and development of the post-Soviet states. This book explores the politics of post-Soviet transition and the problems which will continue to face these states in the twenty-first century as they struggle toward democracy, market reform, ethnic co-existence and integration into a new geopolitical post-Cold War world order. Richly illustrated with examples drawn from Russian and other post-Soviet primary sources, the book focuses upon three broad themes of transition: first, the progression from colonialism to post-colonialism and the consequences of such changes on national identity and the redefinition of national homeland; second, the movement away from totalitarian rule and the processes that both facilitate and challenge the prospects of a democratic future; third, the process of securing a successful place in the global capitalist economy. New theoretical ways are introduced to map out these themes, providing a framework from which to understand the geopolitical, economic and social processes that are likely to shape this transition into the twenty-first century.