This book provides a systematic explanation of a remarkable policy innovation in an emerging economy in the modern world. In doing so, it highlights the nature of the Japanese economy during the interwar period. It offers a canonical case study for an international macroeconomic policy of a small and open economy. Readers can draw lessons from the Japanese experience in the 1930s, recalling what kinds of challenges policymakers faced in a crisis situation, what they can do, and what they should not do. As a whole, it is a novel reference both for scholars in economic history and international economics and for policymakers all over the world. A comprehensive and clear-cut picture of the Japanese economy during the Great Depression in the 1930s is presented, including the policy innovations brought about by an iconoclastic finance minister, Korekiyo Takahashi, at that time. To this end, the book integrates the narrative analysis based on newly available archival documents and the quantitative analysis based on newly constructed macroeconomic data and contemporary econometric methodologies. This work shows how Japan escaped from the depression in its early stage. It illustrates a transmission mechanism of the macroeconomic stimulus package of currency depreciation, easy money, and fiscal expansion. As well, it argues that the key for economic recovery was currency depreciation and that expectations played a pivotal role in ending deflation and kick-starting economic recovery. Also contained here is an exploration of politico-economic interaction in the shaping of economic policy and the long-term consequences of policy actions such as departure from the gold standard and initiation of the government debt finance by the central bank. It is shown that the collapse of the international gold standard and the lack of governance of military spending resulted in a loss of fiscal discipline in the long run.

. . . the book reviewed here will trigger a further interest in this area of research, and will invite more researchers to seek empirical evidence in the study of post-war industrial growth in Japan. Hiroshi Ohashi, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies This book provides a theoretically informed and empirically illustrative account of modern Japanese industrialization. Ozawa s translation of classical political economy to the Japanese context is both original and accessible and is a welcome addition to the literature on the Japanese variety of capitalism. Tim Reiffenstein, Pacific Affairs Ozawa succeeds in extending, building up, and joining the Akamatsu Kojima lineage of this unique Japan-born theory of economic development from a fresh, unconventional, and discerning perspective. From the foreword by Kiyoshi Kojima Terutomo Ozawa examines Japan s once celebrated post-war economic success from a new perspective. He applies a flying geese model of industrial upgrading in a country that is still catching-up, to explore the rise, fall and rebound of Japanese industry with its evolving institutions and policies. The book brings together and expands upon theories developed in the author's work over many years, using them as building blocks for his flying geese model. Concepts explored include: economics of hierarchical concatenation, increasing factor incongruity, comparative advantage (or market) recycling the Ricardo Hicksian trap of industrial production, Smithian growth elan, triumvirate pro-trade structural transformation knowledge creation versus knowledge diversion, the price-knowledge/industry-flow mechanism a la David Hume the syndrome of institutional incongruity, and socially justifiable moral hazard versus degenerative moral hazard. The dynamic process of industrial upgrading is analysed in detail, and important lessons for both developing and transition economies are highlighted. This fascinating book will attract a wide-ranging readership, encompassing practitioners and academics interested in international business, economic development, trade, and political science. In addition, sociologists focussing on business and industry, and researchers on, and policymakers in, developing and transition economies will also find this book of immense interest.

Criticism of current Japanese macroeconomic and financial policies is so wide spread that the reasons for it are assumed to be self-evident. In this volume, Adam Posen explains in depth why a shift in Japanese fiscal and monetary policies, as well as financial reform, would be in Japan's self-interest. He demonstrates that Japanese economic stagnation in the 1990s is the result of mistaken fiscal austerity and financial laissez-faire rather than a structural decline of the "Japan Model." The author outlines a program for putting the country back on the path to solid economic growth - primarily through permanent tax cuts and monetary stabilization - and draws broader lessons from the recent Japanese policy actions that led to the country's continuing stagnation.

"These two volumes analyze Japan from the Knowledge Economy perspective, covering a wide range of sectoral issues in development including the macro economic framework, education and skills training, the national innovation system, science and technology, information and communication technology, and infrastructure. While Volume 1 explores the four pillare of the ""Knowledge for Development"" framework, the second volume presents up-to-date case studies of outstanding Japanese private companies that each characterize different aspects of the Knowledge Economy. By combining economics and business, these volumes allow readers to grasp the full scope of today's knowledge economy."

This paper investigates how monetary policy can help ward off a protracted deflationary slump when policy rates are near the zero bound by studying the experience of Japan during the "Lost Decade" which followed the asset-price bubble collapse in the early 1990s. Estimation results based on a structural model suggest that the Bank of Japan's interest-rate policy fits a conventional forward-looking reaction function with an inflation target of about 1 percent. The disappointing economic performance thus seems primarily due to a series of adverse economic shocks rather than an extraordinary policy error. In addition, counterfactual policy simulations based on the estimated structural model suggest that simply raising the inflation target would not have yielded a lasting improvement in performance. However, a price-targeting rule or a policy rule that combined a higher inflation target with a more aggressive response to output would have achieved superior stabilization results.