This study of the metaphysics of G. W. Leibniz gives a clear picture of his philosophical development within the general scheme of seventeenth-century natural philosophy. Catherine Wilson examines the shifts in Leibniz's thinking as he confronted the major philosophical problems of his era. Beginning with his interest in artificial languages and calculi for proof and discovery, the author proceeds to an examination of Leibniz’s early theories of matter and motion, to the phenomenalistic turn in his theory of substance and his subsequent de-emphasis of logical determinism, and finally to his doctrines of harmony and optimization. Specific attention is given to Leibniz’s understanding of Descartes and his successors, Malebranche and Spinoza, and the English philosophers Newton, Cudworth, and Locke. Wilson analyzes Leibniz’s complex response to the new mechanical philosophy, his discontent with the foundations on which it rested, and his return to the past to locate the resources for reconstructing it. She argues that the continuum-problem is the key to an understanding not only of Leibniz’s monadology but also of his views on the substantiality of the self and the impossibility of external causal influence. A final chapter considers the problem of Leibniz-reception in the post-Kantian era, and the difficulty of coming to terms with a metaphysics that is not only philosophically "critical" but, at the same time, “compensatory.” Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Leibniz’s metaphysics of space and time stands at the centre of his philosophy and is one of the high-water marks in the history of the philosophy of science. In this work, Futch provides the first systematic and comprehensive examination of Leibniz’s thought on this subject. In addition to elucidating the nature of Leibniz’s relationalism, the book fills a lacuna in existing scholarship by examining his views on the topological structure of space and time, including the unity and unboundedness of space and time. It is shown that, like many of his more recent counterparts, Leibniz adopts a causal theory of time where temporal facts are grounded on causal facts, and that his approach to time represents a precursor to non-tensed theories of time. Futch then goes on to situate Leibniz’s philosophy of space and time within the broader context of his idealistic metaphysics and natural theology. Emphasizing the historical background of Leibniz’s thought, the book also places him in dialogue with contemporary philosophy of science, underscoring the enduring philosophical interest of Leibniz’s metaphysics of time and space.

Christia Mercer analyses Leibniz's early works, demonstrating that the metaphysics of pre-established harmony developed many years earlier than previously believed. A much deeper understanding of some of Leibniz's key doctrines emerges, which will prompt scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about early modern philosophy and science.

This anthology is about the signal change in Leibniz's metaphysics with his explicit adoption of substantial forms in 1678-79. This change can either be seen as a moment of discontinuity with his metaphysics of maturity or as a moment of continuity, such as a passage to the metaphysics from his last years. Between the end of his sejour at Paris (November 1676) and the first part of the Hanover period, Leibniz reformed his dynamics and began to use the theory of corporeal substance. This book explores a very important part of the philosophical work of the young Leibniz. Expertise from around the globe is collated here, including Daniel Garber's work based on the recent publication of Leibniz's correspondence from the late 1690s, examining how the theory of monads developed during these crucial years. Richard Arthur argues that the introduction of substantial forms, reinterpreted as enduring primitive forces of action in each corporeal substance, allows Leibniz to found the reality of the phenomena of motion in force, and thus avoid reducing motion to a mere appearance. Amongst other themes covered in this book, Pauline Phemister's paper investigates Leibniz's views on animals and plants, highlighting changes, modifications and elaborations over time of Leibniz's views and supporting arguments and paying particular attention to his claim that the future is already contained in the seeds of living things. The editor, Adrian Nita, contributes a paper on the continuity or discontinuity of Leibniz's work on the question of the unity and identity of substance from the perspective of the relation with soul (anima) and mind (mens).

The essays included in this volume are a mixture of old and new. Three of them make their first appearance in print on this occa sion (Nos III, IV, and V). The remaining four are based upon materials previously published in learned journals or anthologies. (However, these previously published papers have been revised and, generally, expanded for inclusion here.) Detailed acknowl edgement of prior publications is made in the notes to the relevant articles. I am grateful to the editors of these several publications for their kind permission to use this material. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for the Western Ontario Series for some useful corrigenda. And I should like to thank John Horty and Lily Knezevich for their help in seeing this material through the press. NICHOLAS RESCHER Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania May, 1980 xi INTRODUCTION The unifying theme of these essays is their concern with Leibniz's metaphysics of nature. In particular, they revolve about his cos mology of creation and his conception of the real world as one among infinitely many equipossible alternatives.

This book reveals a thread that runs through Leibniz’s metaphysics: from his logical notion of possible individuals to his notion of actual, nested ones. It presents Leibniz’s subtle approach to possibility and explores some of its consequential repercussions in his metaphysics. The book provides an original approach to the questions of individuation and relations in Leibniz, offering a novel account of Leibniz’s notion of Nested Individuals.