People pursue their own interests, whatever those interests might be. Some people have interests that are narrow and selfish, others have interests that are broad and altruistic, still others have interests that are somewhere in between. The idea that people are self-interested underpins all of economic analysis and raises two fundamental questions: 1. How do people choose the actions they think will further their own interests? 2. Can the potentially conflicting interests of different people be made to 'mesh' in some sort of socio-economic equilibrium? This book is devoted to a detailed study of the first question. Its Companion Volume (Economy-Wide Microeconomics: Equilibrium, Optimality, Applications and Tests) makes a detailed study of the second question.This book begins with the Arrow-Debreu theory of consumer choice. This theory supposes people choose so as to maximize a complete, continuous, transitive, and reflexive binary preference relation over a non-empty and compact choice set, under certainty. The book then studies numerous modifications, relaxations, and generalizations of each of these restrictions -- up to and including recent work on Behavioral theories of choice. The study is presented from the Primal, Dual, and Revealed Preference points of view.Consumers are not the only agents in the economy, as Producers are present as well. Starting with the Arrow-Debreu idea that producers choose from a convex production set so as to maximize profit, a study is made of some of the extensions, modifications, and generalizations of this framework that have appeared in the literature. The study is presented from the Primal and Dual points of view.The final chapter in the book provides a link to its Companion Volume. The Chapter indicates how the theories of consumer and producer choice studied here inform answers of the second question posed above.

People pursue their own interests, whatever those interests might be. Some people have interests that are narrow and selfish, while others have interests that are broad and altruistic. The idea that people are self-interested underpins all of economic analysis and raises two fundamental questions: 1. How do people choose the actions they think will further their own interests? 2. Can the potentially conflicting interests of different people be made to 'mesh' in some sort of socio-economic equilibrium? This book is devoted to a detailed study of the first question. Its Companion Volume (Economy-Wide Microeconomics: Equilibrium, Optimality, Applications and Tests) makes a detailed study of the second question.Following some foundational remarks, this book studies the Arrow-Debreu theory of consumer choice. That theory supposes people choose so as to maximize a complete, continuous, transitive, and reflexive binary preference relation over a non-empty and compact choice set. The book then studies numerous refinements, generalizations and extensions of each of these restrictions — up to and including recent work on Behavioral theories of choice and choice behaviour when preferences are intransitive/incomplete/discontinuous. Also considered is choice behaviour in environments that are not necessarily compact. A study is also made of intertemporal choice and choice under uncertainty. The study of Arrow-Debreu choice theory and its extensions are presented from the Primal, Dual, and Revealed Preference points of view.Consumers are not the only agents in the economy, as Producers are present as well. Beginning with a study of the Arrow-Debreu idea that producers choose from a convex production set so as to maximize profit, the book considers extensions and generalizations of this framework, particularly to non-convex environments. The study is presented from the Primal and Dual points of view.The final chapter in the book provides a link to its Companion Volume. The Chapter indicates how the theories of consumer and producer choice studied here help inform answers of the second question posed above.Resources are available to instructors who adopt this book. More details at www.worldscientific.com/worldscibooks/10.1142/12789-sm

Economic concepts and techniques presented through a series of "big questions," models that show how to pose a questions rigorously and work toward an answer. This book helps readers master economic concepts and techniques by tackling fundamental economic and political questions through a series of models. It is organized around a sequence of “big questions,” among them: When do markets help translate individuals' uncoordinated, selfish actions into outcomes that are best for all? Do markets change people, and, if so, for worse or better? Translated into the language of modern economics, do Marx's ideas have merit? Why is there so much income inequality? Or is there too little? The arguments are in the theorem-proof format, distinguishing results derived in the context of fully specified models from educated speculation. Readers will learn how to pose a question rigorously and how to work toward an answer, and to appreciate that even (especially!) the broadest and most ambitious questions call for a model. The goal of the book is not to indoctrinate but to show readers how to reason toward their own conclusions. The first chapter, on the Walrasian model of general equilibrium, serves as the prerequisite for the rest of the book. The remaining chapters cover less conventional topics, including the morality of markets; matching theory; Marxism, socialism, and the resilience of markets; a formalization of Kant's categorical imperative; unintended consequences of policy design; and theories of justice. The book can be used as a textbook for advanced undergraduate or graduate students or as a resource for researchers in disciplines that draw on normative economics.

Ariel Rubinstein's well-known lecture notes on microeconomics—now fully revised and expanded This book presents Ariel Rubinstein's lecture notes for the first part of his well-known graduate course in microeconomics. Developed during the fifteen years that Rubinstein taught the course at Tel Aviv University, Princeton University, and New York University, these notes provide a critical assessment of models of rational economic agents, and are an invaluable supplement to any primary textbook in microeconomic theory. In this fully revised and expanded second edition, Rubinstein retains the striking originality and deep simplicity that characterize his famously engaging style of teaching. He presents these lecture notes with a precision that gets to the core of the material, and he places special emphasis on the interpretation of key concepts. Rubinstein brings this concise book thoroughly up to date, covering topics like modern choice theory and including dozens of original new problems. Written by one of the world's most respected and provocative economic theorists, this second edition of Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory is essential reading for students, teachers, and research economists. Fully revised, expanded, and updated Retains the engaging style and method of Rubinstein's well-known lectures Covers topics like modern choice theory Features numerous original new problems—including 21 new review problems Solutions manual (available only to teachers) can be found at: http://gametheory.tau.ac.il/microTheory/.

In this book, Professor Kreps presents a first course on the basic models of choice theory that underlie much of economic theory. This course, taught for several years at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, gives the student an introduction to the axiomatic method of economic analysis, without placing too heavy a demand on mathematical sophistication.The course begins with the basics of choice and revealed preference theory and then discusses numerical representations of ordinal preference. Models with uncertainty come next: First is von Neumann?Morgenstern utility, and then choice under uncertainty with subjective uncertainty, using the formulation of Anscombe and Aumann, and then sketching the development of Savage's classic theory. Finally, the course delves into a number of special topics, including de Finetti's theorem, modeling choice on a part of a larger problem, dynamic choice, and the empirical evidence against the classic models.

Provides a rigorous treatment of some of the basic tools of economic modeling and reasoning, along with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these tools.

This book provides a comprehensive discussion of the economics of International Trade.Key questions related to why countries trade, how they gain from trade, and how international trade can produce winners and losers are answered. The last of these questions is related to the connection of trade to inequality in the distribution of income.The book uses both theoretical models and empirical evidence to answer these questions. It also provides a discussion of the economics of labor migration and international capital mobility. The book also provides a detailed discussion of the welfare implications of various trade policy instruments such as tariffs, quotas, export subsidies etc. This is followed by a discussion of the process of actual policymaking in democratic societies which goes into the realm of political economy. The focus here is on the political economy of trade policy. It also provides a discussion of the economics of preferential trading agreements and a history of multilateral trading agreements under the aegis of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and its evolution into the World Trade Organization (WTO).