This volume explores the social and political forces behind constitution making from a global perspective. It combines leading theoretical perspectives on the social and political foundations of constitutions with a range of in-depth case studies on constitution making in nineteen countries. The result is an examination of constitutions as social phenomena and their interaction with other social phenomena, from various perspectives in the social sciences.

Should the Supreme Court have the last word when it comes to interpreting the Constitution? The justices on the Supreme Court certainly seem to think so--and their critics say that this position threatens democracy. But Keith Whittington argues that the Court's justices have not simply seized power and circumvented politics. The justices have had power thrust upon them--by politicians, for the benefit of politicians. In this sweeping political history of judicial supremacy in America, Whittington shows that presidents and political leaders of all stripes have worked to put the Court on a pedestal and have encouraged its justices to accept the role of ultimate interpreters of the Constitution. Whittington examines why presidents have often found judicial supremacy to be in their best interest, why they have rarely assumed responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, and why constitutional leadership has often been passed to the courts. The unprecedented assertiveness of the Rehnquist Court in striking down acts of Congress is only the most recent example of a development that began with the founding generation itself. Presidential bids for constitutional leadership have been rare, but reflect the temporary political advantage in doing so. Far more often, presidents have cooperated in increasing the Court's power and encouraging its activism. Challenging the conventional wisdom that judges have usurped democracy, Whittington shows that judicial supremacy is the product of democratic politics.

This title is a compilation of materials designed to bridge the gap between the disciplines of international law and international relations. It could be used as a companion to case books for a course in international law, as a reader in an advanced seminar in international law, or in a political science class on international relations of globalization.

Otfried Höffe is one of the foremost political philosophers in Europe today. In this major work, already a classic in continental Europe, he re-examines philosophical discourse on justice - from Classical Greece to the present day. Höffe confronts what he sees as the two major challenges to any theory of justice: the legal, positivist claim that there are no standards of justice external to legal systems; and the anarchist claim that justice demands the rejection and abolition of all legal and state systems. Höffe sets out to continue the 'philosophical project of modernity', the legitimation of human rights, and their guarantee by the state, while at the same time rehabilitating the classical theory of political justice represented by Plato and Aristotle. He questions the success of the positivists in avoiding extra-legal normative claims, and casts doubt on the plausibility of their criticism of the Natural Law tradition. Most anarchists, he argues, rely on an uncritical assumption that social institutions other than states and legal orders do not coerce. In Höffe's view, some coercion is unavoidable, and the grounds for its justification must be examined. Principles of justice will be those principles which define fundamental rights, and which must be enforced if rights are to be respected.

Foundations of Law is designed to help law and pre-law students make sense of law in a changeful age. It is founded upon the conviction of the English jurist William Blackstone that students who intend to study law need both technical instruction in law and liberal education in the history and jurisprudential concepts of law. The book considers the enduring nature of law and its relationship to equity and justice with the assistance of the authors of what we today call the Great Books. It also emphasizes enduring aspects of legal practice: the role of logic; the meaning and importance of conscience and of due process; different approaches to textual interpretation; and the relation of law to other normative concepts (such as morality and religion) and to science (such as economics). The book surveys classic writings concerning law and justice--for example, the works of Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. It contains writings that are foundational to Anglo-American legal norms and institutions--Blackstone, Bentham, Locke, the Federalists, Lincoln, Holmes, and others. It includes helpful analytical insights from influential jurisprudence scholars--Austin, Hart, Hohfeld, Dworkin, and Finnis, among others. Most uniquely, it matches each of those writings with constitutions, declarations, statutes, judicial decisions, and other legal and political texts (even a letter from jail) that illustrate and reinforce the key lessons drawn from the great works. The book does not leave students adrift in abstractions. It provides a solid grounding for understanding and practicing law in a rapidly-changing world. Combines technical instruction in law with liberal education in the history and jurisprudential concepts of law. Provides a solid grounding in the enduring characteristics of law to enable students to understand and practice law in a rapidly-changing world. Surveys the great books concerning law, equity, and justice. Uniquely matches each great book excerpt with judicial decisions, statutes, proclamations, and other legal materials to illustrate how foundational concepts recur in contemporary legal norms and institutions and to illustrate and reinforce the key lessons drawn from the great works. Emphasizes enduring aspects of legal practice: the role of logic; the meaning and importance of conscience and of due process; different approaches to textual interpretation; and the relation of law to other normative concepts (such as morality and religion) and to science (such as economics). Surveys classic writings concerning law and justice--for example, the works of Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas. Surveys writings that are foundational to Anglo-American legal norms and institutions--for example, the works of Blackstone, Bentham, Locke, the Federalists, Lincoln, and Holmes. Includes helpful analytical insights from influential jurisprudence scholars--Austin, Hart, Hohfeld, Dworkin, and Finnis, among others. Opens each chapter with reading questions to assist beginning students. Follows readings with notes to direct more advanced students to additional reading and further lines of inquiry.

When do governments merit our allegiance, and when should they be denied it? Ian Shapiro explores this most enduring of political dilemmas in this innovative and engaging book. Building on his highly popular Yale courses, Professor Shapiro evaluates the main contending accounts of the sources of political legitimacy. Starting with theorists of the Enlightenment, he examines the arguments put forward by utilitarians, Marxists, and theorists of the social contract. Next he turns to the anti-Enlightenment tradition that stretches from Edmund Burke to contemporary post-modernists. In the last part of the book Shapiro examines partisans and critics of democracy from Plato’s time until our own. He concludes with an assessment of democracy’s strengths and limitations as the font of political legitimacy. The book offers a lucid and accessible introduction to urgent ongoing conversations about the sources of political allegiance.

Foundations of Public Law offers an account of the formation of the discipline of public law with a view to identifying its essential character, explaining its particular modes of operation, and specifying its unique task. Building on the framework first outlined in The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003), the book conceives public law broadly as a type of law that comes into existence as a consequence of the secularization, rationalization and positivization of the medieval idea of fundamental law. Formed as a result of the changes that give birth to the modern state, public law establishes the authority and legitimacy of modern governmental ordering. Public law today is a universal phenomenon, but its origins are European. Part I of the book examines the conditions of its formation, showing how much the concept borrowed from the refined debates of medieval jurists. Part II then examines the nature of public law. Drawing on a line of juristic inquiry that developed from the late sixteenth to the early nineteenth centuries-extending from Bodin, Althusius, Lipsius, Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Pufendorf to the later works of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Smith and Hegel-it presents an account of public law as a special type of political reason. The remaining three Parts unpack the core elements of this concept: state, constitution, and government. By taking this broad approach to the subject, Professor Loughlin shows how, rather than being viewed as a limitation on power, law is better conceived as a means by which public power is generated. And by explaining the way that these core elements of state, constitution, and government were shaped respectively by the technological, bourgeois, and disciplinary revolutions of the sixteenth century through to the nineteenth century, he reveals a concept of public law of considerable ambiguity, complexity and resilience.