This book is an innovative contribution to analytical jurisprudence. It is mainly based on the distinct premises of linguistic philosophy and Carnapian semantics, but also addresses the issues of institutional philosophy, social pragmatism, and legal principles as envisioned by Dworkin, among others. Wróblewski ́s three ideologies (bound/free/legal and rational) and Makkonen ́s three situations (isomorphic/semantically vague/normative gap) of judicial decision-making are further developed by means of 10 frames of legal analysis as discerned by the author. With the philosophical theories of truth serving as a reference, the frames of legal analysis include the isomorphic theory of law (Wittgenstein, Makkonen), the coherence theory of law (Alexy, Peczenik, Dworkin), the new rhetoric and legal argumentation theory (Perelman, Aarnio), social consequentialism (Posner), natural law theory (Fuller, Finnis), and the sequential model of legal reasoning by Neil MacCormick and the Bielefelder Kreis. At the end, some key issues of legal metaphysics are addressed, like the notion of legal systematics and the future potential of the analytical approach in jurisprudence.

Taking up a single question--"What does it mean to say a proposition of law is true?"--this book advances a major new account of truth in law. Drawing upon the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, as well as more recent postmodern theory of the relationship between language, meaning, and the world, Patterson examines leading contemporary jurisprudential approaches to this question and finds them flawed in similar and previously unnoticed ways. He offers a powerful alternative account of legal justification, one in which linguistic practice--the use of forms of legal argument--holds the key to legal meaning.

A leading expert in informal logic, Douglas Walton turns his attention in this new book to how reasoning operates in trials and other legal contexts, with special emphasis on the law of evidence. The new model he develops, drawing on methods of argumentation theory that are gaining wide acceptance in computing fields like artificial intelligence, can be used to identify, analyze, and evaluate specific types of legal argument. In contrast with approaches that rely on deductive and inductive logic and rule out many common types of argument as fallacious, Walton&’s aim is to provide a more expansive view of what can be considered &"reasonable&" in legal argument when it is construed as a dynamic, rule-governed, and goal-directed conversation. This dialogical model gives new meaning to the key notions of relevance and probative weight, with the latter analyzed in terms of pragmatic criteria for what constitutes plausible evidence rather than truth.

Gives students a philosophical appreciation of the existence and importance of objective truth, and lays out three principles of reason that empower them to distinguish truth from error. The principles lay the foundation for an objective and inclusive definition of the human person which embraces everyone from the unborn to those who are disabled, socially marginalized, elderly, and terminally ill. The Teacher’s Resource includes detailed daily learning plans, text notations, and Scripture and Catechism cross-references. Paperback, four chapters, 98 pages. Companion pieces which may be purchased include PowerPoint slides with complete lecture notes, one presentation for each chapter of the book; audio drama CD, Robert & Emma, Act 2: Robert’s Burden”, professionally produced as an audio play, 30 minutes; and one year of access to secure Teacher Website with handouts and assignments, alternative activities, exams and answer keys, training webinars, live chat assistants, classroom webcasts, discussion forums, and bulletin boards.

Provides an essential introduction to classical logic.

Would you want to be operated on by a surgeon trained at a medical school that did not evaluate its students? Would you want to fly in a plane designed by people convinced that the laws of physics are socially constructed? Would you want to be tried by a legal system indifferent to the distinction between fact and fiction? These questions may seem absurd, but these are theories being seriously advanced by radical multiculturalists that force us to ask them. These scholars assert that such concepts as truth and merit are inextricably racist and sexist, that reason and objectivity are merely sophisticated masks for ideological bias, and that reality itself is nothing more than a socially constructed mechanism for preserving the power of the ruling elite. In Beyond All Reason, liberal legal scholars Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry mount the first systematic critique of radical multiculturalism as a form of legal scholarship. Beginning with an incisive overview of the origins and basic tenets of radical multiculturalism, the authors critically examine the work of Derrick Bell, Catherine MacKinnon, Patricia Williams, and Richard Delgado, and explore the alarming implications of their theories. Farber and Sherry push these theories to their logical conclusions and show that radical multiculturalism is destructive of the very goals it wishes to affirm. If, for example, the concept of advancement based on merit is fraudulent, as the multiculturalists claim, the disproportionate success of Jews and Asians in our culture becomes difficult to explain without opening the door to age-old anti-Semitic and racist stereotypes. If historical and scientific truths are entirely relative social constructs, then Holocaust denial becomes merely a matter of perspective, and Creationism has as much "validity" as evolution. The authors go on to show that rather than promoting more dialogue, the radical multiculturalist preferences for legal storytelling and identity politics over reasoned argument produces an insular set of positions that resist open debate. Indeed, radical multiculturalists cannot critically examine each others' ideas without incurring vehement accusations of racism and sexism, much less engage in fruitful discussion with a mainstream that does not share their assumptions. Here again, Farber and Sherry show that the end result of such thinking is not freedom but a kind of totalitarianism where dissent cannot be tolerated and only the naked will to power remains to settle differences. Sharply written and brilliantly argued, this book is itself a model of the kind of clarity, civility, and dispassionate critical thinking which the authors seek to preserve from the attacks of the radical multiculturalists. With far-reaching implications for such issues as government control of hate speech and pornography, affirmative action, legal reform, and the fate of all minorities, Beyond All Reason is a provocative contribution to one of the most important controversies of our time.