This incisive book offers an innovative understanding of Rousseau’s politico-legal philosophy to illustrate the legal significance of plural agency and what it means for a people to act together. Testing these ideas in controversial contemporary debates, Bert van Roermund provides a critical assessment of ‘political theology’ and establishes a new interpretation of joint action as bodily entrenched.

In this innovative exploration, told-to narratives, or collaboratively produced texts by Aboriginal storytellers and (usually) non-Aboriginal writers, are not romanticized as unmediated translations of oral documents, nor are they dismissed as corruptions of original works. Rather, the approach emphasizes the interpenetration of authorship and collaboration. Focused on the 1990s, when debates over voice and representation were particularly explosive, this captivating study examines a range of told-to narratives in conjunction with key political events that have shaped the struggle for Aboriginal rights to reveal how these narratives impact larger debates about Indigenous voice and literary and political sovereignty.

The question whether and how boundaries might individuate and thereby be constitutive features of any imaginable legal order has yet to be addressed in a systematic and comprehensive manner by legal and political theory. This book seeks to address this important omission, providing an original contribution to the debate about law in a global setting. Against the widely endorsed assumption that we are now moving towards law without boundaries, it argues that every imaginable legal order, global or otherwise, is bounded in space, time, membership, and content. The book is built up around three main insights. Firstly, that legal orders can best be understood as a form of joint action in which authorities mediate and uphold who ought to do what, where, and when with a view to realising the normative point of acting together. Secondly, that behaviour can call into question the boundaries that determine who ought to do what, where and when: a-legality. Thirdly, that this a-legality reveals boundaries as marking a limit and, to a lesser or greater extent, a fault line of the respective legal order. Legal boundaries reveal ways of ordering the who, what, where, and when of behaviour which have been excluded, yet which remain within the range of practical possibilities accessible to the collective: limits. However legal boundaries also intimate an order which exceeds the range of possibilities accessible to that collective - the fault line of the respective legal order. Careful analysis of a wide range of legal orders, including nomadism, Roman law, classical international law, ius gentium, multinationals, cyberlaw, lex mercatoria, the EU, global regimes of human rights, and space law validates this thesis. What sense, then, can we make of the normativity of the law, if there can be no inclusion without exclusion? Arguing that legal and political theories misunderstand how legal boundaries do their work of including and excluding, the book develops a normative theory of legal order which is alternative to both communitarianism and cosmopolitanism.

Constitutional law has been and remains an area of intense philosophical interest, and yet the debate has taken place in a variety of different fields with very little to connect them. In a collection of essays bringing together scholars from several constitutional systems and disciplines, Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law unites the debate in a study of the philosophical issues at the very foundations of the idea of a constitution: why one might be necessary; what problems it must address; what problems constitutions usually address; and some of the issues raised by the administration of a constitutional regime. Although these issues of institutional design are of abiding importance, many of them have taken on new significance in the last few years as law-makers have been forced to return to first principles in order to justify novel practices and arrangements in their constitutional orders. Thus, questions of constitutional 'revolutions', challenges to the demands of the rule of law, and the separation of powers have taken on new and pressing importance. The essays in this volume address these questions, filling the gap in the philosophical analysis of constitutional law. The volume will provoke specialists in philosophy, politics, and law to develop new philosophically grounded analyses of constitutional law, and will be a valuable resource for graduate students in law, politics, and philosophy.

Current Legal Issues, like its sister volume Current Legal Problems (now available in journal format), is based upon an annual colloquium held at University College London. Each year leading scholars from around the world gather to discuss the relationship between law and another discipline of thought. Each colloquium examines how the external discipline is conceived in legal thought and argument, how the law is pictured in that discipline, and analyses points of controversy in the use, and abuse, of extra-legal arguments within legal theory and practice. Law and Language, the fifteenth volume in the Current Legal Issues series, offers an insight into the scholarship examining the relationship between language and the law. The issues examined in this book range from problems of interpretation and beyond this to the difficulties of legal translation, and further to non-verbal expression in a chapter tracing the use of sign language at the Old Bailey; it examines the role of language and the law in a variety of literary works, including Hamlet; and considers the interrelation between language and the law in a variety of contexts, including criminal law, contract law, family law, human rights law, and EU law.

This history of legal language slices through the polysyllabic thicket of legalese. The text shows to what extent legalese is simply a product of its past and demonstrates that arcane vocabulary is not an inevitable feature of our legal system.

Private international law has long been understood as a doctrinal and technical body of law, without interesting theoretical foundations or implications. By systematically exploring the rich array of philosophical topics that are part of the fabric of private international law, Philosophical Foundations of Private International Law fills a significant and long-standing void in the legal and philosophical literature. The contributions to this volume are testimony to the significant potential for interaction between philosophy and private international law. Some aim to expand and rethink classical jurisprudential theories by focusing on law beyond the state and on the recognition of foreign law and judgments in domestic courts. Others bring legal and moral theories to bear on traditional debates in private international law, such as legal pluralism, transnational justice, the interpretation of foreign legal policies, and the boundaries of the legal system. Several engage with the history of both private international law and legal and political philosophy. They point to missed opportunities when philosophers ignored law's transnational dimensions, or when private international law scholars failed to position their theories within broader philosophical schools of thought. Some seek to complete past attempts to articulate the philosophical dimensions of private international law that were never carried through. Thought-provoking and topical, this volume displays the varied themes cutting through the disciplines of private international law and philosophy.