In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.

Kemmerling deftly intertwines the efficiency theory of taxation with the political basis of taxing the working poor. . . This commendable effort in interdisciplinary study and the comparative analysis of taxation is an essential reference for undergraduate and graduate students, as well as faculty and professionals of economics, political science, and taxation systems of Europe. S. Chaudhuri, Choice Taxing the Working Poor is an inspiring read for political scientists and economists interested in the relationship between taxation and employment. Based on an elegant combination of econometric analysis and historical case studies, it shows that the alleged trade-off between employment and progressive taxation has political rather than economic roots. Philipp Genschel, Jacobs University Bremen, Germany What are the economic and political forces which generate different regimes of tax on labour? What are the implications for the labour market of these different regimes? And does globalisation bring a halt to tax-based redistribution? Achim Kemmerling tackles these and other important questions in this significant book. Malcolm Sawyer, University of Leeds, UK We have been distracted from the detailed problems of financing the welfare state by the tired old twentieth-century debate between libertarian tax minimisers and maximal socialist collectivisers. We have to move on. The welfare state has to be accepted and the detailed problems of taxation to sustain it have to be addressed. This well-researched and fascinating book addresses the political and institutional origins of different tax systems and points to viable strategies of redistribution and reform. Geoffrey M. Hodgson, University of Hertfordshire, UK In most industrialized countries the tax burden of poor people has increased dramatically over the last few decades. This book analyses both the political origins of this increase and its consequences for the labour market. Achim Kemmerling illustrates that tax-based redistribution and employment are not incompatible, and that the shift away from redistribution has not occurred on grounds of economic efficiency. He goes on to show that a long-term shift from capital to labour taxation has provoked conflicts of interests between workers that have weakened the political cause of tax-based redistribution. This interdisciplinary account of the political economy of taxing low wages explains the historical and structural origins of political tensions between different types of workers and their effects on the performance of labour markets. As such, it will strongly appeal to a wide-ranging audience, including academics, students and researchers with a special interest in political science, political economy, labour markets and the economics of taxation. Practitioners in the field of labour market, social and tax policies interested in the normative consequences of taxation for the labour market will also find the book to be of great interest.

The paper analyzes the role of labor market segmentation and relative wage rigidity in the transmission process of macroeconomic shocks in a two-sector optimizing model of a small open economy. The analysis is first conducted in the context of perfect intersectoral labor mobility. The discussion is then extended to consider the existence of short-run constraints on labor movements. The results highlight the role of efficiency considerations in the behavior of sectoral wages. A deflationary policy induces a reallocation of labor across sectors, but has no long-run effect on the unemployment rate.