In Know Thy Enemy, Meir Litvak analyzes the evolving attitudes towards various internal and external collective “others”, in post-revolutionary Iranian Shiʿism as a novel way to examine the formulation of Shiʿi self-perception and its place in the world.

As World War II ended, few Americans in government or universities knew much about the Soviet Union. As David Engerman shows in this book, a network of scholars, soldiers, spies, and philanthropists created an enterprise known as Soviet Studies to fill in this dangerous gap in American knowledge. This group brought together some of the nation's best minds from the left, right, and center, colorful and controversial individuals ranging from George Kennan to Margaret Mead to Zbigniew Brzezinski, not to mention historians Sheila Fitzpatrick and Richard Pipes. Together they created the knowledge that helped fight the Cold War and define Cold War thought. Soviet Studies became a vibrant intellectual enterprise, studying not just the Soviet threat, but Soviet society and culture at a time when many said that these were contradictions in terms, as well as Russian history and literature. And this broad network, Engerman argues, forever changed the relationship between the government and academe, connecting the Pentagon with the ivory tower in ways that still matter today.

A penetrating look into the inner logic of al-Qa'ida and like-minded extremist groups by which they justify September 11 and other terrorist attacks includes specific ideologies of jihadism, a new movement that allows members to call for the destruction of democracy and to murder innocent men, women, and children.

CD-ROM contains: Examples of network traces, code, system binaries, and logs used by intruders from the blackhat community.

Profiles the personalities and strategic cultures of some of the United States' most dangerous international rivals.

The records of the Joint Intelligence Committee, Britain's senior intelligence body, are now being released to the public on the same basis as other official papers. As a result, historians have available a unique archive revealing British thinking at the highest level about the world situation and threats confronting the West in the critical years after World War II. This book, by Sir Percy Cradock - for many years himself Chairman of the JIC as well as the Prime Minister's Foreign Policy Advisor - explores these hitherto top secret records and the interplay of JIC estimates and warnings with British foreign policy decisions over the first 23 years from 1945. He concentrates on the great crises of the Cold War, Berlin, Korea, Suez, Cuba, Vietnam and Czechoslovakia, but also examines some lesser emergencies involving Britain alone, such as Kuwait, confrontation with Indonesia, and Rhodesia. He compares the British organization and performance with the parallel system of US intelligence and the very different machinery of the KGB. In a final chapter he reflects on the intimate relations between intelligence and policy, and how Britain adjusted to a long period of declining power. This study aims to be a valuable addition to historical knowledge and to offer an insight into the development of Western as well as British foreign policy.