This book is a study of the power of the American Supreme Court to interpret laws and overrule any found in conflict with the Constitution. It examines the landmark case of Marbury versus Madison (1803), when that power of judicial review was first fully articulated.

"This book provides a thorough overview of the law of judicial and political control of federal agencies. The primary focus is on the availability and scope of judicial review, but the book also discusses the control exercised by the U.S. president and Congress"--Provided by publisher.

Despite having the final word on many policy issues, state supreme courts have received much less scholarly attention than the United States Supreme Court. Examining these often neglected institutions, this book demonstrates that by increasing our knowledge of the behavior of state supreme court judges across differing areas of law, we can enrich our understanding of the function of state supreme courts, and the relations between these institutions and other branches of government. In addition, Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts advances our conceptualization of the judiciary and offers a more general theory about judicial behavior, accountability, and the role of courts in American society. Langer looks at the policy-making powers of state supreme courts, and the conditions under which justices are most likely to review and invalidate state laws, portraying judges as forward thinking individuals who pursue both policy and electoral goals.

Judicial Review: A New Zealand Perspective was the first book of its kind that gave a detailed commentary on the subject of Judicial review in New Zealand. The book is a treatise on the subject and well regarded in the Practitioner and Academic markets. It consists of four parts: The Basic Structure of Judicial Review, The Process of Judicial Review, Procedure and Evidence, and Ground of Judicial Review.

In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.