Contents Anthony De Jasay The Python That Eats Itself By The Tail Sergio Beraldo – Enrico Colombatto – Valerio Filoso – Marco Stimolo Growth in One (Short) Lesson Franklin G. Mixon Jr. The Allocation of Death in the Afghanistan War Remembering James Buchanan Richard E. Wagner – Francesco Forte – Domenico da Empoli Forum on public procurement, quality of expenditure and saving Emma Galli Introduction Sergio Santoro Reference Prices and Standard Costs in Public Procurement as Tools against Corruption Claudio De Rose Corruption in Public Procurement: How to Fight and Prevent It? Mario Lupo Contracts of Public Works: How to Guarantee Low Prices Without Reducing Quality Ilde Rizzo Efficiency and Integrity Issues in Public Procurement Performance Gabriella M. Racca The Risks of Emergencies in Public Procurement Gian Luigi Albano On the Problem of Quality Enforcement in Centralized Public Procurement Symposium Domenico da Empoli On Federalism and Government Size David Hebert – Richard E. Wagner Taxation as a Quasi-Market Process Richard E. Wagner – Akira Yohoyama Polycentrism, Federalism, and Liberty Yong J. Yoon – William F. Shughart II Stackelberg on the Danube River Reviews

In this volume, based on a week-long symposium at the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies, two leading scholars of governmental economics debate their divergent perspectives on the role of government and its fiscal functions. James M. Buchanan, who was influential in developing the research program in public choice, concentrates on the imperfections of the political process and stresses the need for rules to restrain governmental interference. Richard A. Musgrave, a founder of modern public finance, points to market failures and inequities that call for corrective public policies. They apply their differing economic and political philosophies to a variety of key issues. Each presentation is followed by a response and general discussion.

The Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice began publication in 1983 under the title Economia delle scelte pubbliche, changing to its present title in 1998. Under either name, the Journal reflected the founding editor's (Domenico da Empoli) desire to amplify and extend the Italian orientation toward public finance that Antonio de Viti de Marco (1888) set in motion. It's fitting that James Buchanan's (1983) “The Public Choice Perspective” opened the Journal, for Buchanan (1960) was instrumental in promoting awareness among Anglo-Saxon scholars of the Italian tradition that da Empoli sought to carry forward in establishing the JPFPC. With da Empoli's death in December 2016, the Journal is now proceeding with a new editorial team (Emma Galli and Giampaolo Garzarelli) and a new publisher (Bristol University Press). The Journal's orientation, however, remains unchanged, in that it continues to welcome contributions within public finance and public choice within the broad tradition outlined here. In this essay, I mark this change in editorial regime by reviewing how Buchanan's orientation toward public finance continues and extends the tradition that de Viti (1888) began.

Contents RFranklin G. Mixon, Jr. - ErnestW. King - Matthew L. Lawing Modeling the Impact of Localism in U.S. Presidential Elections Alan A. Lockard Campaign Expenditures under Proportional Representation and Plurality Voting Athanassios Pitsoulis - Jens Peter Siebel Political and Economic Effects of Tax Competition and Deficits Dalibor Rohác? Emergence of Cooperation in Public Goods Problems Reviews

Behavioral economics questions the basic underpinnings of economic theory, showing that people often do not act consistently in their own self-interest when making economic decisions. While these findings have important theoretical implications, they also provide a new lens for examining public policies, such as taxation, public spending, and the provision of adequate pensions. How can people be encouraged to save adequately for retirement when evidence shows that they tend to spend their money as soon as they can? Would closer monitoring of income tax returns lead to more honest taxpayers or a more distrustful, uncooperative citizenry? Behavioral Public Finance, edited by Edward McCaffery and Joel Slemrod, applies the principles of behavioral economics to government's role in constructing economic and social policies of these kinds and suggests that programs crafted with rational participants in mind may require redesign. Behavioral Public Finance looks at several facets of economic life and asks how behavioral research can increase public welfare. Deborah A. Small, George Loewenstein, and Jeff Strnad note that public support for a tax often depends not only on who bears its burdens, but also on how the tax is framed. For example, people tend to prefer corporate taxes over sales taxes, even though the cost of both is eventually extracted from the consumer. James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick assess the impact of several different features of 401(k) plans on employee savings behavior. They find that when employees are automatically enrolled in a retirement savings plan, they overwhelmingly accept the status quo and continue participating, while employees without automatic enrollment typically take over a year to join the saving plan. Behavioral Public Finance also looks at taxpayer compliance. While the classic economic model suggests that the low rate of IRS audits means far fewer people should voluntarily pay their taxes than actually do, John Cullis, Philip Jones, and Alan Lewis present new research showing that many people do not underreport their incomes even when the probability of getting caught is a mere one percent. Human beings are not always rational, utility-maximizing economic agents. Behavioral economics has shown how human behavior departs from the assumptions made by generations of economists. Now, Behavioral Public Finance brings the insights of behavioral economics to analysis of policies that affect us all.