In Appearance in Reality, John Heil addresses a question at the heart of metaphysics: how are the appearances related to reality, how does what we find in the sciences comport with what we encounter in everyday experience and in the laboratory? Objects, for instance, appear to be colourful, noisy, self-contained, and massively interactive. Physics tells us they are dynamic swarms of colourless particles, or disturbances in fields, or something equally strange. Is what we experience illusory, present only in our minds? But then what are minds? Do minds elude physics? Or are the physicist's depictions mere constructs with no claim to reality? Perhaps reality is hierarchical: physics encompasses the fundamental things, the less than fundamental things are dependent on, but distinct from these. Heil's investigation advances a fourth possibility: the scientific image (what we have in physics) affords our best guide to the nature of what the appearances are appearances of.

If we didn't possess certain beliefs about such things as time, appearance and reality, and how effect follows cause, we wouldn't be able to get out of bed in the morning, let alone read a book about metaphysics, which is the study of our experience and those ideas, or presuppositions, which allow us to make sense of it. Drawing on examples from art, science, and daily life, John Heil shows how metaphysics begins in questioning our everyday assumptions about how the world “works” and ends with speculation on the nature of the universe itself. In chapters that cover the major topics in the academic study of metaphysics, from free will and consciousness to time and objectivity, Heil explains how metaphysical questions underpin everything human beings do. This accessible book will show you how professional philosophers try to categorize and make sense of our world of perception and experience and explains why everyone should take metaphysics seriously.

In this book the author what it means to be physical, mental, or abstract entity, and how they relate to the concept of reality. His answers are framed in terms of a comprehensive ontology of substances, and properties inspired by Descartes, Locke, their successors, and their latter day exemplars.

This comprehensive and leading textbook has been revised and reworked building on the themes of the first edition. As before it covers all aspects of the nature of mind, and is ideal for anyone coming to philosophy of mind for the first time.

An injury does more than physically limit an athlete; it also challenges the athlete's mental game and emotional equilibrium. This is a comprehensive guide to treating the psychological consequences of sport injuries.

Is the world hierarchically arranged, incorporating 'levels' of reality? What is the nature of objects and properties? What does 'realism' about ordinary objects or states of mind demand? When an assertion is true, what makes it true? Are natural properties best regarded as qualities or powers or some combination of these? What are colours? What explains the 'projective' character of intentionality? What is the nature of consciousness, and what relation do conscious experiences bear to material states and processes? From an Ontological Point of View endeavours to provide answers to such questions through an examination of ground-floor issues in ontology. The result is an account of the fundamental constituents of the world around us and an application of this account to problems dominating recent work in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The book, written in an accessible, non-technical style, is intended for non-specialists as well as seasoned

Historically, philosophical discussions of relations have featured chiefly as afterthoughts, loose ends to be addressed only after coming to terms with more important and pressing metaphysical issues. F. H. Bradley stands out as an exception. Understanding Bradley's views on relations and their significance today requires an appreciation of the alternatives, which in turn requires an understanding of how relations have traditionally been classified and how philosophers have struggled to capture their nature and their ontological standing. Positions on these topics range from the rejection of relations altogether, to their being awarded the status as grounds for everything else, to various intermediary positions along this spectrum. Love them, hate them, or merely tolerate them, no philosopher engaged in ontologically serious metaphysics can afford to ignore relations.