John F. Kennedy entered the White House hoping to make America and the world a better and safer place in which to live. Through diplomacy, he wanted to achieve a settlement of the East-West tensions and to bring about a peaceful resolution to such issues as the Israeli-Arab conflict. Although his provision of defensive HAWK anti-aircraft missiles, in response to Russian, French, and British arms sales to the Arabs, made him the first President to supply arms to Israel, Kennedy feared both exacerbation of the arms race and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While he remained an honest and loyal friend to Israel, he also attempted to further America's relationship with the Arab states and to encourage a settlement of the Arab refugee issue. Kennedy was an independent thinker who learned how to rely upon his own best judgment and intelligence rather than upon his father or officials like Dean Rusk or Allen Dulles. Kennedy ultimately agreed to regular consultations between Israeli and American military personnel, but he would not agree to a dual alliance nor would he allow America to become Israel's main source of military equipment. The author contends that it was this precarious and uncertain diplomatic and military situation that encouraged Israel to develop its own defense industries and to investigate the possibilities of producing its own nuclear weapons systems.

This volume seeks to reconstruct the process by which the Kennedy administration decided to sell to Israel Hawk surface-to-air missiles. It argues that both domestic considerations and political calculations were part of a highly complex decision made by members of Washington's high policy elite.

David Becomes Goliath, Volume II of Hart’s multi-volume work, ZIONISM, THE REAL ENEMY OF THE JEWS, reveals in well-documented detail starting from 1948 how the assertion that Israel has lived in constant danger of annihilation, of the “driving into the sea” of its Jews, is little more than Zionist propaganda. What really was the case, after Israel unilaterally declared itself to be in existence, was that the Arab armies did not have the ability-neither the numbers nor the weapons-to defeat Israel’s forces. Despite some stupid Arab rhetoric to the contrary-a propaganda gift for Zionism of which it has made extensive and ongoing use-the Arab regimes had no intention of even trying to destroy Israel. They were quickly at one with Zionism and the major powers in wanting the Palestine file to remain closed after Israel’s first victory on the battlefield. There was not supposed to have been a regeneration of Palestinian nationalism: for them, Arafat’s real crime was making this happen. Here, too, is the riveting story of how Zionism, assisted by deluded British Prime Minister Eden and America’s hawks, conned the Western world into believing that Eygpt’s President Nasser was an enemy of the West when actually he was seeking an accommodation with Israel from almost his first days in power, and wanted more than anything else a relationship with America on equal terms with that of Israel. Hart also takes us inside the struggle of the first and last American president, Eisenhower, to attempt to contain Zionism, and President Kennedy’s unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Zionist state acquiring an atom bomb (an acquisition still unadmitted by either the US or Israel, to this very day). But most importantly, Volume II records a turning point: the story of the defeat of reason in Israel, with Ben-Gurion’s replacement of Israel’s second Prime Minister, Moshe Sharett, who in October 12, 1955 expressed in his diary this prescient fear for the future in view of the ongoing Zionist expansionism of his time: “What is our vision on this earth-war to the end of generations and life by the sword?”

Originally published in 2007, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, by John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen M. Walt of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, provoked both howls of outrage and cheers of gratitude for challenging what had been a taboo issue in America: the impact of the Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy. A work of major importance, it remains as relevant today as it was in the immediate aftermath of the Israel-Lebanon war of 2006. Mearsheimer and Walt describe in clear and bold terms the remarkable level of material and diplomatic support that the United States provides to Israel and argues that this support cannot be fully explained on either strategic or moral grounds. This exceptional relationship is due largely to the political influence of a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction. They provocatively contend that the lobby has a far-reaching impact on America's posture throughout the Middle East―in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict―and the policies it has encouraged are in neither America's national interest nor Israel's long-term interest. The lobby's influence also affects America's relationship with important allies and increases dangers that all states face from global jihadist terror. The publication of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy led to a sea change in how the U.S-Israel relationship was discussed, and continues to be one of the most talked-about books in foreign policy.

Israel's Armor provides a foundational history of the Israel lobby and its influence on American foreign policy.