Islamist militants based in Pakistan have played a major role in terrorism around the world and pose a significant threat to regional and international security. Although the Pakistan-militant connection has received widespread attention only in recent years, it is not a new phenomenon. Pakistan has, since its inception in the wake of World War II, used Islamist militants to wage jihad in order to compensate for severe political and material weakness. This use of militancy has become so important that it is now a central component of Pakistani grand strategy; supporting jihad is one of the principal means by which the Pakistani state seeks to produce security for itself. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the strategy has not been wholly disastrous. It has achieved important domestic and international successes, enabling Pakistan to confront stronger adversaries and shape its strategic environment without the costs and risks of direct combat, and to help promote internal cohesion to compensate for its weak domestic political foundations. Recently, however, these successes of Pakistan's militant strategy have given way to serious problems. The militant organizations that Pakistan nurtured over the decades are increasingly exceeding its control; continued support for jihad diverts scarce resources from pressing domestic projects, impeding the country's internal development; and the militant campaign's repeated provocations have led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture. As Paul Kapur shows in Jihad as Grand Strategy, these developments significantly undermine Pakistani interests, threatening to leave it less politically cohesive and externally secure than it was before. Thus, despite its past benefits, the strategy has outlived its utility, and Pakistan will have to abandon it in order to avoid catastrophe. This will require not simply a change of policy, but a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the Pakistani state.

When we talk about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, armed forces and civilian governments, then controversies and uninvited misperceptions swirl in our minds. If we take in the broad picture, we inevitably conclude that not all is going in the right direction in the country; and that is because the army, politicians and the establishment perceive jihadism as a profitable business. They run this business of killings and torture through their proxies. While we study the militarized mind of Pakistani generals and recognize their resentment towards civilian governments, we find more controversies about the role of armed forces and their relationship with worldwide terrorist organizations. International journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai is ideally positioned to present us with a picture of what is actually afoot and what it means for the future. When we study the militarized mind of Pakistani generals and recognize their resentment towards civilian institutions, we find more controversies about the role of armed forces and their relationship with worldwide terrorist organizations. The Pakistan military controls the financial market, stock exchange, real estate business, banking sector, and smuggling of narcotics. Ethnic representation within the armed forces raises serious concerns. Some experts say this is not a national army but view it as the club of Pashtun and Punjabi generals. The army has failed to develop a true ethnic representation process or motivate Baloch and Sindhis to join the armed forces; but they certainly have gained experience in killing innocent civilians. Then there is the question of the Saudi investment in Pakistan's "Islamic" nuclear bomb. Saudi Arabia's link with Pakistan's nuclear and missile program has long been the source of speculation that Pakistan might either station nuclear forces on Saudi sand or provide a nuclear umbrella to the Wahabi state, in return for oil supply; or that the Saudis would purchase nuclear weapons from Pakistan. International journalist Musa Khan Jalalzai is ideally positioned to present us with a picture of what is actually afoot and what it means for the future.

The Jihadist ideology has destroyed the world from East to West. They have tried to implement Shariah Law. People use and abuse religion in order to create fear and anxiety within the victim. Counter Terrorism experts, as well as governmental departments, are fighting on many frontlines. There already exists Islamist ideology that challenges the writ of the governmental authority and other issues that have damaged the democratic values of the state like the right-wing terrorism and ethno-nationalist fundamentalism, such as in Spain and Italy. We are stuck between two world orders, Islamic and democratic world order. Both these powers have now been fighting each other for nearly half a century, from colonialism to political Islamic era till the 21st century when the world became a global village. Terrorists are using new technologies in relations to lure vulnerable people and the western youths are their easy target to recruit. We must apply the right tools to eliminate such ideology that corrupted millions of minds.

Pakistan is host to the largest concentration of jihadist groups in the world. Since the 1980s, the Pakistani state has been accused of sponsoring local jihadist groups and sending Pakistani volunteers to support them. This book is based on almost 114 interviews, conducted mainly in Urdu and Pashto, from within Al-Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups. It examines the relationship between the Pakistani security agencies and Al-Qaeda, and how they both became entangled and used by the local jihadists they were themselves trying to exploit. The interviews paint a picture of the shifting strategies and priorities of the different jihadi groups in the early 21st century, covering their ideological objectives, their agreements and disagreements over tactics, as well as pressure from rival militant groups and internal factionalism. The book is the most in-depth study of jihadism in Pakistan, and Antonio Giustozzi highlights the strategies global jihadists deployed after 9/11 and how Al-Qaeda tried to manage the largest jihadist group in Pakistan, the Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The book also covers other key issues in South Asian security, such as the impact of Islamic State on Al Qaeda's power after 2014, why Al-Qaeda continue to back the TTP, and what is happening with the groups focused on taking jihad to Kashmir and India.

Explores the long and contentious relationship between the United States and Pakistan since it was partitioned from India, with emphasis on events that occurred during the author's 30-year career with the CIA and on how Pakistan's history and U.S. responses have contributed to the current struggle with terrorism.

Veteran Pakistani journalist and commentator Zahid Hussain explores Pakistan's complex political power web and the consequences of Musharraf's decision to support America's drive against jihadism, which essentially took Pakistan to war with itself. Conducting exclusive interviews with key players and grassroots radicals, Hussain pinpoints the origin of the jihadi movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the long-standing and often denied links between militants and Pakistani authorities, the weaknesses of successive elected governments, and the challenges to Musharraf's authority posed by politico-religious, sectarian, and civil society elements within the country. The jihadi madrassas of Pakistan are incubators of the most feared terrorists in the world. Although the country's "war on terror" has so far been a stage show, a very real battle is looming, the outcome of which will have grave implications for the future security of the world.