Japan as a 'Normal Country'? is a thematic and geographically comparative discussion of the unique limitations of Japanese foreign and defence policy.

For decades, Japan's foreign policy has been seen by both internal and external observers as abnormal in relation to its size and level of sophistication. Japan as a 'Normal Country'? is a thematic and geographically comparative discussion of the unique limitations of Japanese foreign and defence policy. The contributors reappraise the definition of normality and ask whether Japan is indeed abnormal, what it would mean to become normal, and whether the country can—or should—become so. Identifying constraints such as an inflexible constitution, inherent antimilitarism, and its position as a U.S. security client, Japan as a 'Normal Country'? goes on to analyse factors that could make Japan a more effective regional and global player. These essays ultimately consider how Japan could leverage its considerable human, cultural, technological, and financial capital to benefit both its citizens and the world.

A must read for businessmen and Japan watchers, this official version of the political bombshell translated privately by the CIA is the incisive and unprecedented one-man political manifesto of the former secretary-general of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic party. "Far reaching".--Henry Kissinger.

This essay argues that it is not a good idea to propose keywords to help find the "essence" of Japanese law. In fact, such an approach may well be the problem as we search for a single lens with which to analyze a complex society. Our perceptions of Japan, related to both exaggerated views of early postwar success and subsequent failure and to a preoccupation with cultural explanations, may hinder, rather than aid, careful analysis of Japanese law and its impact on society. This essay instead proposes that we treat Japan as a "normal" country that has both similarities to and differences with other advanced societies. Those with expertise and experience in Japan can contribute to the understanding of Japan by supplying the Japanese context in which law operates.Many of the problems of perceptions and stereotypes that involve Japanese law and society are also shared with China and other Asian and non-Western societies. Japanese law scholars should also make greater efforts to collaborate with other Asian law scholars to counter exaggerated cultural perceptions and to increase understanding of their work among general legal comparativists and the general public.

The so-called pacifist clause of the Japanese Constitution (Article 9) binds the Japanese people forever to renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Beyond Pacifism argues that Japan must either repeal Article 9, or face a future in which Japan might be compelled to surrender sovereign authority in order to appease one or more of its immediate neighbors. If Japan cannot free itself of the constraints of its constitutional pacifism and choose to become a normal nation, willing and able to defend itself and its interests, it must endure what former Prime Minister Koizumi describes as the peace of slaves. Since 1952 Japan has followed the path of reinterpreting Article 9 in order to work around its pacifist strictures. Many Japanese party leaders—including prime ministers Abe and Koizumi—have called for Article 9 to be revised by the addition of a clause authorizing the use of force for the purpose of self-defense against aggression directed against the Japanese nation. Most foreign commentators and scholars urge Tokyo to continue to work around Article 9 without amendment. By contrast, the author argues that neither reinterpretation nor revision will allow Japan to counter the growing military threats from North Korea and China. Japan's health as a democratic state, contends Middlebrooks, requires an honest re-alignment of its law with its modern national identity, which is normal and no longer poses a militaristic threat to regional stability.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has not sought to remilitarize, and its postwar constitution commits to renouncing aggressive warfare. Yet many inside and outside Japan have asked whether the country should or will return to commanding armed forces amid an increasingly challenging regional and global context and as domestic politics have shifted in favor of demonstrations of national strength. Tom Phuong Le offers a novel explanation of Japan’s reluctance to remilitarize that foregrounds the relationship between demographics and security. Japan’s Aging Peace demonstrates how changing perceptions of security across generations have culminated in a culture of antimilitarism that constrains the government’s efforts to pursue a more martial foreign policy. Le challenges a simple opposition between militarism and pacifism, arguing that Japanese security discourse should be understood in terms of “multiple militarisms,” which can legitimate choices such as the mobilization of the Japan Self-Defense Forces for peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief missions. Le highlights how factors that are not typically linked to security policy, such as aging and declining populations and gender inequality, have played crucial roles. He contends that the case of Japan challenges the presumption in international relations scholarship that states must pursue the use of force or be punished, showing how widespread normative beliefs have restrained Japanese policy makers. Drawing on interviews with policy makers, military personnel, atomic bomb survivors, museum coordinators, grassroots activists, and other stakeholders, as well as analysis of peace museums and social movements, Japan’s Aging Peace provides new insights for scholars of Asian politics, international relations, and Japanese foreign policy.