The role of the Far East is becoming increasingly important in global geopolitics. Japan's economic might and sphere of geographical influence, between China, North Korea and the US, means it has the potential to be a major ally in the War on Terror. While Japan's constitution does not allow for militarism or acts of war, in the post 9/11 world the use of the Japanese nation's 'Self-Defence Force' has become increasingly normal - a result of the exploitation of legal loopholes and political double-speak that has been used to bypass Japan's pacifist ideology. Here, Michael Penn assesses the role of US diplomats and lobbyists in Tokyo, the politicians who see the War on Terror as a means of self-advancement and the influence of Washington in the unprecedented deployment of Japanese troops in Iraq. Written using a huge range of primary source material, including interviews with US insiders and Japanese policy makers, this is a scholarly and lucid account of Japan's relationship to the US and the Middle East from 9/11 to Barack Obama and the death of Osama Bin Laden.

Tracing the course of conflicts throughout Asia in the past century, this groundbreaking volume is the first to explore systematically the nexus of war and state terrorism. Challenging states' definitions of terrorism, which routinely exclude their own behavior, the book focuses especially on the nature of Japanese and American wars and crimes of war. This rare comparative perspective examines the ways in which state terror leads to civilian casualties, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In counterbalance, they discuss anti-war movements and international efforts to protect human rights. This interdisciplinary volume will resonate with readers searching for a deeper understanding of an era dominated by war and terror.

Written by a Zen priest, this book explodes the myth of Zen Buddhism as a peaceful religion. Can Buddhism, widely regarded as a religion of peace, also contribute to acts of terrorism? Through an insider’s view of right-wing ultranationalism in prewar Japan, this powerful book follows a band of Zen Buddhist–trained adherents who ardently believed so. Brian Victoria, himself a Zen priest, tells the story of a group of terrorists who were responsible for the assassination of three leading political and economic figures in 1932. Victoria provides a detailed introduction to the religious as well as political significance of the group’s terrorist beliefs and acts, focusing especially on the life and times of the band’s leader, Inoue Nisshō. A deeply troubled youth, Inoue became a spy in Manchuria for the Japanese Army in 1909, where he encountered Zen for the first time. When he returned to Japan in 1921, he determined to resolve his deep spiritual discontent through meditation practice, which culminated in an enlightenment experience that resolved his long-term doubts.After engaging in “post-enlightenment training” under the guidance of Rinzai Zen master Yamamoto Gempō, Inoue began a program of training the “patriotic youth” who formed the nucleus of his terrorist band. After the assassinations, Inoue and his band were sentenced to life imprisonment, only to be released just a few years later in 1940. Almost unbelievably, Inoue then became the live-in confidant of Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, a position he held through the end of WWII. In the postwar era, Inoue reinvented himself again as the founder and head of yet another band of ultranationalists known as the “National Protection Corps.” His eventful life came to an end in 1967. Victoria concludes with an assessment of the profound impact of the assassinations, which culminated in Japan’s transformation into a totalitarian state and set the stage for Pearl Harbor. The author also examines the connection of Buddhism to terrorism more broadly, considering the implications for today’s Islamic-related terrorism.

Japan’s Holy War reveals how a radical religious ideology drove the Japanese to imperial expansion and global war. Bringing to light a wealth of new information, Walter A. Skya demonstrates that whatever other motives the Japanese had for waging war in Asia and the Pacific, for many the war was the fulfillment of a religious mandate. In the early twentieth century, a fervent nationalism developed within State Shintō. This ultranationalism gained widespread military and public support and led to rampant terrorism; between 1921 and 1936 three serving and two former prime ministers were assassinated. Shintō ultranationalist societies fomented a discourse calling for the abolition of parliamentary government and unlimited Japanese expansion. Skya documents a transformation in the ideology of State Shintō in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth. He shows that within the religion, support for the German-inspired theory of constitutional monarchy that had underpinned the Meiji Constitution gave way to a theory of absolute monarchy advocated by the constitutional scholar Hozumi Yatsuka in the late 1890s. That, in turn, was superseded by a totalitarian ideology centered on the emperor: an ideology advanced by the political theorists Uesugi Shinkichi and Kakehi Katsuhiko in the 1910s and 1920s. Examining the connections between various forms of Shintō nationalism and the state, Skya demonstrates that where the Meiji oligarchs had constructed a quasi-religious, quasi-secular state, Hozumi Yatsuka desired a traditional theocratic state. Uesugi Shinkichi and Kakehi Katsuhiko went further, encouraging radical, militant forms of extreme religious nationalism. Skya suggests that the creeping democracy and secularization of Japan’s political order in the early twentieth century were the principal causes of the terrorism of the 1930s, which ultimately led to a holy war against Western civilization.

“Tells how America, since the end of World War II, has turned away from its ideals and goodness to become a match setting the world on fire” (Seymour Hersh, investigative journalist and national security correspondent). World War II marked the apogee of industrialized “total war.” Great powers savaged one another. Hostilities engulfed the globe. Mobilization extended to virtually every sector of every nation. Air war, including the terror bombing of civilians, emerged as a central strategy of the victorious Anglo-American powers. The devastation was catastrophic almost everywhere, with the notable exception of the United States, which exited the strife unmatched in power and influence. The death toll of fighting forces plus civilians worldwide was staggering. The Violent American Century addresses the US-led transformations in war conduct and strategizing that followed 1945—beginning with brutal localized hostilities, proxy wars, and the nuclear terror of the Cold War, and ending with the asymmetrical conflicts of the present day. The military playbook now meshes brute force with a focus on non-state terrorism, counterinsurgency, clandestine operations, a vast web of overseas American military bases, and—most touted of all—a revolutionary new era of computerized “precision” warfare. In contrast to World War II, postwar death and destruction has been comparatively small. By any other measure, it has been appalling—and shows no sign of abating. The author, recipient of a Pulitzer Prize and a National Book Award, draws heavily on hard data and internal US planning and pronouncements in this concise analysis of war and terror in our time. In doing so, he places US policy and practice firmly within the broader context of global mayhem, havoc, and slaughter since World War II—always with bottom-line attentiveness to the human costs of this legacy of unceasing violence. “Dower delivers a convincing blow to publisher Henry Luce’s benign ‘American Century’ thesis.” —Publishers Weekly

Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.