Contents: (1) Overview; (2) Evaluating the Annapolis Process: Signs of Progress or of Setbacks?; Debate Over the Urgency of Reaching a 2-State Solution; Windows of Opportunity for Consensus on the Peace Process; Going Forward from Annapolis; (3) Changes Since Oslo: Middle East Geopolitics; Demographic Concerns -- Arabs to Outnumber Jews?; Violence and Palestinian Factionalism; Impediments to Palestinian Territorial Contiguity and Movement; (4) Alternatives to a 2-State Solution: ¿1-State Solution¿; Israeli Unilateralism; ¿Jordanian¿ or ¿Regional¿ Option; ¿Status Quo¿; (5) The U.S. Approach.; The Role of Hamas; Capacity-Building for Palestinian Moderates; Israeli Settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Maps.

One year after the formal renewal of direct talks at the Nov 2007 Annapolis Conference, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) have been unable to come to terms on a final-status peace agreement, despite possible signs of progress. Differences between the two sides continue over core issues such as borders, security, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, refugees, and water rights, despite their mutual acceptance of the concept of a negotiated "two-state solution" that would establish a Palestinian state alongside Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pursuant to the principle of "land for peace." Previously when talks have faltered, the parties eventually returned to the negotiating table. Yet, there are a growing number of key actors and observers expressing doubts that the very concept of a negotiated two-state solution can survive a process in which talks are put on hold and resumed an indefinite number of times without finality. Some observers dismiss these doubts as mere tactics meant to prod either or both parties to action. Prospects for a two-state solution appear more tenuous given uncertainties that a consensus supporting the peace process will hold in the face of upcoming leadership transitions in the United States and Israel and conflicting claims to Palestinian leadership. In addition to wavering confidence in the peace process, changes with respect to geopolitics, demographics, violence between Israelis and Palestinians, factionalism among Palestinians, Israeli settlements, and other impediments to Palestinian movement and territorial contiguity may have significantly altered the likelihood of reaching a two-state solution since the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993. Decreased hope in the viability of a two-state solution has led some Israelis and Palestinians to consider alternative solutions that appear to be contrary to U.S. policy: a one-state solution, a Jordanian or regional option, or other, unilaterally-imposed outcomes.

Diplomats, politicians and activists alike have long laboured under the assumption that a two-state solution is the only path to peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians. But as this conflict continues unabated, and violence and instability deepen, it seems that the ideal of two states coexisting alongside each other and the ever-elusive goal of peace slip further from reach. The Failure of the Two-State Solution examines the impasse in the Israel-Palestine conflict, exploring the reasons behind the breakdown of attempts to establish a meaningful Palestinian state. This book therefore points to another - until recently unthinkable - option: a single bi-national state in Israel-Palestine, with all inhabitants sharing in equal rights and citizenship, regardless of ethnicity or faith. Hani A. Faris has drawn together a wide-ranging and in-depth analysis of the historical and current situation in Israel-Palestine. By analysing the history of the conflict in Israel-Palestine and its numerous peace initiatives, this book demonstrates how the current deadlock has been reached. With a nascent Palestinian state hampered by Israeli security policy and internal political divisions and the continuing expansion of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, it is argued here that the viability of the two-state solution seems to have run its course. And so highlights the one-state solution as an option, and debates and develops the organisational steps and strategies, on a local and international level, that would enable the construction of a bi-national state. With scholars from the US, Europe, the Arab world and Israel analysing the possibility of a one-state solution and the shortcomings of the two-state track, this is an important and ground-breaking book for students of Politics, International Relations, Peace Studies and Middle East Studies and all interested in the resolution of this seemingly intractable conflict.

Israel in the Post Oslo Era examines the official Israeli stands and policies towards the Palestinian problem from the beginning of the twenty-first century. The book argues that Israel is gradually withdrawing from the commitment of a two-state solution and from the general framework of the peace process that started in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo accord. The main factor behind Israel’s shift regarding the conflict and its resolution is related to the steady and gradual rise of the Israeli right since the 2009 general elections, to reach the "dominant block" status. These fundamental changes are the result of profound social transformations, such as the functional significance of marginal groups. The unprecedented growth of the right disputes basic questions, addressed in this book, including the official Israeli approach towards the Palestinian problem in general, particularly the two-state solution. The book examines these developments and the overall Israeli withdrawal from the peace process and its commitment to a two-sate solution. Israel in the Post Oslo Era is an invaluable resource for students and researchers interested in Arab-Israeli conflict resolutions, Middle East and Israeli Politics.

The one-state solution demonstrates that Israeli settlements have already encroached on the occupied territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the extent that any Palestinian state in those areas is unviable. It reveals the irreversible impact of Israel's settlement grid by summarising its physical, demographic, financial and political dimensions. Virginia Q.Tilley explains why we should assume that this grid will not be withdrawn - or its expansion reversed - by reviewing the role of the key political actors: the Israeli government, the United States, the Arab states, and the European Union. Finally the book addresses the daunting obstacles to a one-state solution - including major revision of the Zionist dream but also Palestinian and other regional resistance - and offers some ideas about how these obstacles might be addressed.

A critical examination of the history of US-Palestinian relations The United States has invested billions of dollars and countless diplomatic hours in the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace and a two-state solution. Yet American attempts to broker an end to the conflict have repeatedly come up short. At the center of these failures lay two critical factors: Israeli power and Palestinian politics. While both Israelis and Palestinians undoubtedly share much of the blame, one also cannot escape the role of the United States, as the sole mediator in the process, in these repeated failures. American peacemaking efforts ultimately ran aground as a result of Washington’s unwillingness to confront Israel’s ever-deepening occupation or to come to grips with the realities of internal Palestinian politics. In particular, the book looks at the interplay between the U.S.-led peace process and internal Palestinian politics—namely, how a badly flawed peace process helped to weaken Palestinian leaders and institutions and how an increasingly dysfunctional Palestinian leadership, in turn, hindered prospects for a diplomatic resolution. Thus, while the peace process was not necessarily doomed to fail, Washington’s management of the process, with its built-in blind spot to Israeli power and Palestinian politics, made failure far more likely than a negotiated breakthrough. Shaped by the pressures of American domestic politics and the special relationship with Israel, Washington’s distinctive “blind spot” to Israeli power and Palestinian politics has deep historical roots, dating back to the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate. The size of the blind spot has varied over the years and from one administration to another, but it is always present.

The future of the West Bank and Gaza remains the single most crucial issue in the search for peace in the Middle East. Heller outlines the conditions under which he believes the establishment of a Palestinian state could be the optimal solution. He also discusses the economic prospects of a Palestinian state and the future of Jerusalem.