Central banks actively engage in sterilized foreign exchange market intervention despite numerous empirical studies indicating that these operations do not systematically affect the exchange rate. Are these policies misguided and central bankers irrational? Or is evidence showing the effectiveness of sterilized intervention being overlooked? This paper argues the latter, providing evidence on the effectiveness of sterilized intervention using an event study approach linking intervention with systematic exchange rate changes. Studies using time-series techniques are limited by the nature of the data: intense and sporadic bursts of intervention activity juxtaposed against exchange rates that change almost continuously on a daily basis. The event study framework used in standard finance studies, by contrast, is better suited to this circumstance. Focusing on daily Bundesbank and US official intervention operations, we identify separate intervention quot;episodesquot; and analyze the subsequent effect on the exchange rate. Using the nonparametric sign test and matched-sample test, we find strong evidence that sterilized intervention systemically affects the exchange rate in the short-run. This result is robust to changes in event window definitions over the short-run and to controlling for central bank interest rate changes during events.

This paper addresses the question of whether sterilized central bank intervention systematically affects exchange rates. Furthermore, the paper analyzes whether a central bank can conduct its intervention operations in a specific manner, in order to increase the likelihood of achieving its objectives. The first question is addressed by applying the event study methodology of the finance literature to daily data on Bundesbank and Fed post-Plaza intervention. Using the non-parametric sign test and the matched sample test, evidence of effectiveness in terms of a systematic association between exchange rate levels and intervention is found. The second question is addressed by estimating binary choice models of the conditional probabilities of observing a successful intervention operation over observations when at least one of the two central banks were intervening. The results suggest that central banks can in fact improve the likelihood of success primarily through coordination and, also, if intervention occurs infrequently.

How much impact on exchange rates do central banks have when they buy and sell currencies? According to many analysts, such intervention has no independent impact. This book challenges the conventional wisdom, demonstrating that such intervention can be an effective and extremely important tool for policymakers. Using previously unavailable daily intervention data from the US Federal Reserve and German Bundesbank, the authors show that even "sterilized" intervention -intervention that entails no corresponding changes in monetary policy- has a significant effect. A key element is whether the intervention is known to the public: widespread market awareness of the activity adds substantially to its payoff. Authors Dominguez and Frankel draw implications for intervention policy and its role in international economic policy coordination.

The accumulation of large foreign asset positions by many central banks through sustained foreign exchange (FX) intervention has raised questions about its associated fiscal costs. This paper clarifies conceptual issues regarding how to measure these costs both from an ex-post and an ex-ante (relevant for decision making) perspective, and estimates both marginal and total costs for 73 countries over the period 2002-13. We find ex-ante marginal costs for the median emerging market economy (EME) in the inter-quartile range of 2-5.5 percent per year; while ex-ante total costs (of sustaining FX positions) in the range of 0.2-0.7 percent of GDP per year for light interveners and 0.3-1.2 percent of GDP per year for heavy interveners. These estimates indicate that fiscal costs of sustained FX intervention (via expanding central bank balance sheets) are not negligible.

This paper presents a rule for foreign exchange interventions (FXI), designed to preserve financial stability in floating exchange rate arrangements. The FXI rule addresses a market failure: the absence of hedging solution for tail exchange rate risk in the market (i.e. high volatility). Market impairment or overshoot of exchange rate between two equilibria could generate high volatility and threaten financial stability due to unhedged exposure to exchange rate risk in the economy. The rule uses the concept of Value at Risk (VaR) to define FXI triggers. While it provides to the market a hedge against tail risk, the rule allows the exchange rate to smoothly adjust to new equilibria. In addition, the rule is budget neutral over the medium term, encourages a prudent risk management in the market, and is more resilient to speculative attacks than other rules, such as fixed-volatility rules. The empirical methodology is backtested on Banco Mexico’s FXIs data between 2008 and 2016.

During the twentieth century, foreign-exchange intervention was sometimes used in an attempt to solve the fundamental trilemma of international finance, which holds that countries cannot simultaneously pursue independent monetary policies, stabilize their exchange rates, and benefit from free cross-border financial flows. Drawing on a trove of previously confidential data, Strained Relations reveals the evolution of US policy regarding currency market intervention, and its interaction with monetary policy. The authors consider how foreign-exchange intervention was affected by changing economic and institutional circumstances—most notably the abandonment of the international gold standard—and how political and bureaucratic factors affected this aspect of public policy.