Odds that the Iran nuclear deal can be revived have diminished over recent months. The expansion of Iran’s nuclear program is eroding the nonproliferation value of the deal and, at some point, returning to the deal will no longer be in the United States’ interest. What are those technical changes underway in Iran’s nuclear program? And why exactly might they imperil a chance at restoring the JCPOA? The technical developments taking place will remain relevant if and when the original participants in the nuclear deal reconvene in Vienna to negotiate its revival. Indeed, changes to Iran’s nuclear program and related elements—particularly over the past year, but some going back longer—have implications that go beyond the JCPOA. These changes—a mix of progress in some areas and setbacks in others—not only make a return to the original JCPOA more difficult, but they will also require that the United States rethink how to detect any future attempt by Iran to build nuclear weapons as well as the benefits and risks of various policy options for containing Iran’s nuclear program.

As Iran?'s nuclear program evolves, U.S. decisionmakers will confront a series of critical policy choices involving complex considerations and policy trade-offs. These policy choices could involve dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons; deterring Iran from using its nuclear weapons, if it were to acquire them; and reassuring U.S. regional partners. The U.S. Air Force will need to prepare to carry out whatever policies are chosen.

This monograph reexamines the strategic implications for the United States in the event Iran moves ahead to acquire nuclear weapons capability. This study draws on expert workshops held in the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University (NDU) in January and February 2005, as well as meetings, interviews, and research conducted at NDU and elsewhere over the past several years. Chapters are as follows: "Iran's Perspective: National Rights and Nuclear Weapons," "Neighbors, Negotiators, and Nonproliferators," and "U.S. Policy Options." Appendixes include "Timeline of Iran's Path to Nuclear Weapons," "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status, Risks, and Prospects," and "Walking the Tightrope: Israeli Options in Response to Iranian Nuclear Developments."

Steven Hurst traces the development of the US - Iranian nuclear weapon crisis from the conception of Iran's nuclear programme in 1957 to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. Hurst adopts a broader perspective on the Iranian nuclear programme and explains the continued failure of the USA to halt it.

This book explores the determinants of Iran's foreign policy towards its GCC neighboring countries. She considers the dimensions of internal and external, as well as identity and nationalism. AL-Saad aims to identify the strategic importance of Iran's nuclear program, the agreement with the major powers in 2015, and its impact on Iran's foreign policy. She then addresses possible future scenarios and implications of Iran's foreign policy towards the GCC region, upon the US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal.

ABSTRACT: Iran's nuclear program continues to present a major challenge to U.S. policy. At the core of this challenge is one fundamental question: Is Iran attempting to build a nuclear weapon? Objective analysis reveals that Iran's dependence on oil and natural gas provides sufficient economic merit for Iran to pursue a peaceful nuclear program; without nuclear power to meet rising domestic energy needs, Iran's economy will suffer. Though the economic justification is valid, the security of Iran and the survival of its regime are overarching; acts of foreign interference in Iran's affairs have fueled the regime's quest for a nuclear weapon. For this reason, U.S. administrations since the 1979 revolution have striven to derail Iran's nuclear program through policies of containment, isolation, and denial of nuclear technology. Considering the current standoff between Iran and the U.S., we must ask another key question: How effective have U.S. policies been? The answer is simple; Iran has made significant progress in its nuclear program. Sanctions, political pressure, and threats proved no obstacle to Iran; worse still, ignoring IAEA and others' reports that found no convincing evidence that Iran is building nuclear weapons damaged U.S. efforts significantly. Iran's progress makes it clear that U.S. policies have failed, and its strategies must be discarded in favor of a new approach. This research implicates that a non-confrontational engagement policy, which acknowledges Iran's needs to build a peaceful nuclear program will provide President Obama and the U.S. the highest probability of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Iran's nuclear program is one of this century's principal foreign policy challenges. Despite U.S., Israeli, and allied efforts, Iran has an extensive enrichment program and likely has the technical capacity to produce at least one nuclear bomb if it so chose. This study assesses U.S. policy options, identifies a way forward, and considers how the United States might best mitigate the negative international effects of a nuclear-armed Iran.