Since the turn of the century Iran has experienced three major political upheavals in the struggle to democratize her political systems. The last revolution inaugurated an era of unprecedented turmoil and instead of fulfilling its democratic aim, paved the way for an even more despotic theocracy. To put the revolution in a proper perspective, some attempt is made to explain the reasons for Khomeini’s success in acquiring first, the symbolic leadership of the anti-Shah revolution, and then, the monopolistic control of power in Iran. How and why the other claimants to power were shunted aside and later brutally repressed is a further theme for discussion. The domestic and external ramifications of the revolution are examined in detail; in particular the rise of the anti-American feeling which culminated in the hostage crisis. In conclusion, an analysis is offered of the instrumentalities of power available to the Islamic Republic, and several scenarios are explored in which Iran’s competing forces may converge to determine whether this third revolution will finally succeed in subordinating political authority to popular democratic consent.

This book analyses the distant and proximate causes of the 1978 revolution in Iran as well as the dynamics of power which it set in motion. The volume explains the complex and far-reaching processes which produced the revolution, beginning in the late nineteenth century. In explaining the more proximate causes of the revolution, the book analyses the nature of the old regime and its internal contradictions; the emergence of some fundamental conflicts of interest between the state and the upper class; the economic crisis of 1975-8 which made possible a revolutionary mass immobilisation; and the emergence of a new religious interpretation of political authority and the unusual spread of the ideology of political Islam among a segment of the modern intelligentsia. The volume relates the diverse aspects of class, ideology and economic structure in order to provide an understanding of the political processes.

This book is a fascinating critical examination of the characteristics and development of the armed forces in Iran, their role under the Shah and their re-creation in the war against Iraq as the fighting forces of Islam. The author examines the contradictory accounts, including the Shah’s own Answer to History, as well as newly available accounts by highly placed ex-officials, and interviews with exiled army officers. He examines in detail the apparent shift of allegiance within the forces from the Shah to Imam and the ways in which this was accomplished. Major Iranian offensives, changing strategies from human wave assault to the Tankers War, and the delicate balance between the regular Army and the Revolutionary Guards, are also extensively examined. The book concludes with an analysis of the potential role of the armed forces in a succession crisis.

Relations between the USSR and Iran during the period from the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic up to early 1983 are reviewed in this book. It begins with a brief survey of Russian-Persian relations in earlier years, with a focus on the developments that served as a background to the current events. It examines Soviet attitudes and reactions to Iran’s foreign and internal policy and highlights the way in which the Soviets often raise events of which they do not approve in order to draw Iran closer to them. In particular, the book discusses the Soviet response to the Iran-Iraq war and the position of the Tudeh Party and the other leftists within Iran. Iran’s policy towards the USSR is treated at length and it is shown that it is suspicious of a tacit USA-USSR agreement over the fate of Iran. Khomeini’s attempts to isolate Iran from both East and West are also reviewed. This book was one of the first to discuss this crucial dimension in Middle East politics and it makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the forces driving the Iranian Revolution.

In this book experts examine the main features of Iran’s foreign policy from 1980 – 1990, assessing relations with the UN, the superpowers, Europe, the GCC and Iraq. Although the Islamic revolution made Iran a significant force in the international arena, it is argued that the ending of the Cold War and the rise of Iraq as the dominant power in the Gulf are now creating a very different set of foreign policy challenges and options.

This book is a fascinating critical examination of the characteristics and development of the armed forces in Iran, their role under the Shah and their re-creation in the war against Iraq as the fighting forces of Islam. The author examines the contradictory accounts, including the Shahâe(tm)s own Answer to History, as well as newly available accounts by highly placed ex-officials, and interviews with exiled army officers. He examines in detail the apparent shift of allegiance within the forces from the Shah to Imam and the ways in which this was accomplished. Major Iranian offensives, changing strategies from human wave assault to the Tankers War, and the delicate balance between the regular Army and the Revolutionary Guards, are also extensively examined. The book concludes with an analysis of the potential role of the armed forces in a succession crisis.

This book examines the structure and ideology of all the main leftist groups in Iran. It considers their role in the Revolution, and analyses their relations with Khomeini and his colleagues. It also explains why the majority of the leftist organisations had defected from the Islamic regime by the summer of 1981. A second important theme of the book is the way in which the Soviet Union responded to the treatment of the Left by the Islamic government. Based on extensive analysis of original source material in Farsi and other languages and numerous interviews with leftist leaders and participants, the book provides a detailed portrait of the Left in contemporary Iran.