Abstract: The paper presents a dynamic model for small to medium open economies operating under a fixed exchange rate regime. The model provides a partial explanation of the channels through which fiscal and monetary policy affects the real exchange rate. An empirical investigation is conducted for the case of Argentina during the currency board period of 1991-2001. Empirical estimates show that fiscal policy may indeed be an efficient instrument for promoting macroeconomic stability insofar as it encourages convergence toward long-run equilibrium and alters the long-term balance between exports and consumption, both private and public. The simulation applied to Argentina shows that if the share of public spending in the economy is higher than the share of imports, an increase in the tax rate will stimulate capital stock slightly, at least in the short term, and depreciate the real effective exchange rate. In the long run, the fiscal policy affects the value of the real exchange rate and consequently external competitiveness.

The paper presents a dynamic model for small to medium open economies operating under a fixed exchange rate regime. The model provides a partial explanation of the channels through which fiscal and monetary policy affects the real exchange rate. An empirical investigation is conducted for the case of Argentina during the currency board period of 1991-2001. Empirical estimates show that fiscal policy may indeed be an efficient instrument for promoting macroeconomic stability insofar as it encourages convergence toward long-run equilibrium and alters the long-term balance between exports and consumption, both private and public. The simulation applied to Argentina shows that if the share of public spending in the economy is higher than the share of imports, an increase in the tax rate will stimulate capital stock slightly, at least in the short term, and depreciate the real effective exchange rate. In the long run, the fiscal policy affects the value of the real exchange rate and consequently external competitiveness.

The paper presents a dynamic model for small to medium open economies operating under a fixed exchange rate regime. The model provides a partial explanation of the channels through which fiscal and monetary policy affects the real exchange rate. An empirical investigation is conducted for the case of Argentina during the currency board period of 1991-2001. Empirical estimates show that fiscal policy may indeed be an efficient instrument for promoting macroeconomic stability insofar as it encourages convergence toward long-run equilibrium and alters the long-term balance between exports and consumption, both private and public. The simulation applied to Argentina shows that if the share of public spending in the economy is higher than the share of imports, an increase in the tax rate will stimulate capital stock slightly, at least in the short term, and depreciate the real effective exchange rate. In the long run, the fiscal policy affects the value of the real exchange rate and consequently external competitiveness.

It is well known that the long-run viability of a fixed exchange rate regime imposes constraints on monetary policy. This paper shows that, in a model with forward-looking agents, short-run viability imposes a fiscal constraint. When policy change, which destroys long-run viability, also violates the fiscal constraint, collapse is instantaneous. Delayed predictable collapse requires satisfaction of the fiscal constraint.

In recent years the conventional wisdom has held that fixed rates provide more fiscal discipline than do flexible rates. In this paper we show that this wisdom need not hold in a standard model in which fiscal policy is endogenously determined by a maximizing fiscal authority. The claim that fixed rates induce more discipline stresses that sustained adoption of lax fiscal policies must eventually lead to an exhaustion of reserves and thus to a politically costly collapse of the peg. Hence, under fixed rates bad behavior today leads to punishment tomorrow. Under flexible rates bad behavior has costs as well. The difference is in the intertemporal distribution of these costs: flexible rates allow the effects of unsound fiscal policies to manifest themselves immediately through movements in the exchange rate. Hence, bad behavior today leads to punishment today. If fiscal authorities are impatient, flexible rates - by forcing the costs to be paid up-front - provide more fiscal discipline and higher welfare for the representative private agent. The recent experience of Sub- Saharan countries supplies some preliminary evidence that matches the predictions of the model.

External sector policies and exchange rate policy are central to a country's economic performance and to the IMF's surveillance functions. The papers in this book, edited by Richard Barth and Chorng-Huey Wong, were presented at a seminar on Exchange Rate Policy in Developing and Transition Economies held by the IMF Institute. They analyze choices of exchange rate regimes, issues affecting management of exchange regimes, and specific types of regimes, including case studies from the former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, and Latin America.