They began as courtiers in a hierarchy of privilege, but history remembers them as patriot-citizens in a commonwealth of equals. On April 18, 1775, a riot over the price of flour broke out in the French city of Dijon; that same night, across the Atlantic, Paul Revere mounted the fastest horse he could find. So began what have been called the "sister revolutions" of France and America. In a single narrative, this book tells the story of those revolutions and shows just how deeply intertwined they actually were. Their leaders, George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette, were often seen as father and son, but their relationship, while close, was every bit as complex as the long, fraught history of the French-American alliance. Vain, tough, ambitious, they strove to shape their characters and records into the form they wanted history to remember.--From publisher description.

In this provocative new book, the distinguished diplomatic historian Thomas G. Paterson explores why and how Americans have perceived and exaggerated the Communist threat in the last half century. Telling the story through rich analysis and substantial research in private papers, government archieves, oral histories, contemporary writings, and scholarly works, Paterson explains the origins and evolution of United States global intervention. In penetrating essays on the ideas and programs of Harry S. Truman, George F. Kennan, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, John F. Kennedy, Richard M. Nixon, Henry A. Kissisnger, and Ronald Reagan, as well as on the views of dissenters from the prevailing Cold War mentality, Paterson reveals the tenacity and momentum of American thinking about threats from abroad. Paterson offers a thorough review of postwar American attitudes toward totalitariansim, the causes of international conflict, and foreign aid, and he then demonstrates how Truman acted upon these views, launched the containment doctrine, and exercised American power in both Europe and Asia. A fresh look at Eisenhower's policy in the Middle East explains how the United States became a major player in that volatile region. Paterson also presents an incisive critique of Kennedy's foreign policy, describing an administration propelled by lessons from Truman's era, an assertive, "can-do" style, and a grandiose notion of America's nation-building responsibilities in the Third World. Arrogance, ignorance, and impatience, Paterson argues, combined with familiar exaggerations of Soviet capabilities and intentions, to produce a rash of crises, from the Bay of Pigs and missile crisis in Cuba to the war in Vietnam. Other chapters study the flawed record of 1970s detente, CIA covert actions and the failure of congressional oversight from the 1940s to the present, and Reagan's rewriting of the history of the Vietnam War. In the last chapter, Paterson demolishes the argument that the Vietnam War could have been won and probes the analogy between Vietnam and Central America in the 1980s. Americans did not invent the Communist threat, Paterson contends, but they have certainly exaggerated it, nurturing a trenchant anti-communism that has had a devastating effect on international relations and American institutions. An important backdrop to recent foreign policy, Meeting the Communist Threat combines extensive scholarship and perceptive analysis to provide a vivid account of Cold War policy in America.