For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

This is a curated and comprehensive collection of the most important works covering matters related to national security, diplomacy, defense, war, strategy, and tactics. The collection spans centuries of thought and experience, and includes the latest analysis of international threats, both conventional and asymmetric. It also includes riveting first person accounts of historic battles and wars. Some of the books in this Series are reproductions of historical works preserved by some of the leading libraries in the world. As with any reproduction of a historical artifact, some of these books contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. We believe these books are essential to this collection and the study of war, and have therefore brought them back into print, despite these imperfections. We hope you enjoy the unmatched breadth and depth of this collection, from the historical to the just-published works.

Current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are indicators that the Army will be required to conduct counter-insurgency, stability, and reconstruction operations for the foreseeable future. National Security Presidential Directive-44 and Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, both issued in December 2005, recognize the importance and issue guidance for improving the U.S. Government's ability to prosecute security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations as a joint interagency team. In light of these directives and current realities, how can we best implement them to accomplish our strategic objectives? How can the intent of these directives most effectively be implemented at the operational and tactical level, where the roots of strategic success are planted, in the short and long term? The multi-national and interagency nature of these operations requires careful review of the organizational structure, training, and command relationships to achieve a coordinated effort. The Army's individual, leader, and collective training must prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to operate effectively as small units in a decentralized environment.