During the decades of the cold war U.S. science and technology (S & T) indisputably led the world and served as an essential enabler for the intelligence and military forces required to support our strategy of deterrence and containment. The world has changed significantly since then: deterrence and containment are tangential to the problems posed by terrorism and radical Islam, but intelligence and the other instruments of national power have not yet found the right alternative. The effort reported here focuses on one piece of this complex issue: the impact on the Intelligence Community of the new global S & T landscape. Much of what we recommend involves change, but change implies risk. More than ever in the past, pervasive risk aversion severely hobbles innovation in the Intelligence Community. The dramatic change in the nature of the threat and the potential adversaries we face compounds this problem to critical levels. Unless the Intelligence Community leadership can break through and create a realistic risk management approach to such issues as increasing direct analyst involvement in the most important areas of private sector S & T expertise, the Intelligence Community will have wasted its efforts. Leadership is the answer, and that leadership, that permission to take measured risk, must come from the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

In late 1998 the Undersecretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested the Defense Science Board to create a task force on training and education. The task force met periodically throughout 1999 and 2000. This document is the report of our deliberations.

Globalization-the integration of the political, economic and cultural activities of geographically and/or nationally separated peoples-is not a discernible event or challenge, is not new, but it is accelerating. More importantly, globalization is largely irresistible. Thus, globalization is not a policy option, but a fact to which policymakers must adapt. Globalization has accelerated as a result of many positive factors, the most notable of which include: the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War; the spread of capitalism and free trade; more rapid and global capital flows and more liberal financial markets; the liberalization of communications; international academic and scientific collaboration; and faster and more efficient forms of transportation. At the core of accelerated global integration-at once its principal cause and consequence-is the information revolution, which is knocking down once-formidable barriers of physical distance, blurring national boundaries and creating cross-border communities of all types.

The 1996 Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on 'Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield' submits this report to document its work, findings and recommendations, which extends and refines the prior year's study on the same subject. The Task Force was asked to: (1) review and evaluate the progress made in implementing the recommendations made last year; (2) identify further actions that could be quickly implemented to improve the safety and effectiveness of the coalition forces in Bosnia prior to and during their redeployment; and (3) recommend longer term actions to prepare for future contingencies. This report documents detailed recommendations for each one of the three parts of the assignment. While the 1995 study focused on contributions that the recommended technology and equipment additions would have on operations in Bosnia Herzegovina and other Theater sites, this year's report highlights the need for changes in operations as well as joint, Service and coalition doctrine to leverage the deployed technology and equipment infrastructure. However, the non- technological' changes are at least as important to make as the technological' changes and will require strong commitment and leadership at all levels for effective implementation. The Task Force found numerous systemic barriers to achieving information dominance. With the potential for deployment of ground forces and the resulting increased operational stress, the shortcomings and unnecessary risks would be expected to increase unless significant changes were made.

Collection and analysis of foreign intelligence is, and will continue to be, a vital component of U.S. national security strategy. However, there is significant debate regarding whether our existing intelligence apparatus can sufficiently transform itself to meet the demands of the 21st century. The Department of Defense (DoD) has a vested interest in this debate - both as a customer and as a major supplier - because the goals of the National Military Strategy cannot be achieved in the absence of a robust foreign intelligence apparatus. This task force first examined the anticipated 2lst century threat environment, focusing on how the threats and adversaries are changing in the post-Cold War era. We then worked to characterize future intelligence customers' needs, again emphasizing how the dynamic global security environment is altering both needs and expectations. Finally, we formulated a top-level opinion of the strategic posture of today's Intelligence Community (IC) and its ability to meet the needs of its primary DoD customers - with particular emphasis on the warfighter. Our recommendations are intended to better position the IC to meet the evolving demands of its diverse customer base.

The Defense Science Board (DSB) Advisory Group was asked to examine the use of operations research (OR) methods to support Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) decision making within the DoD. The DSB was asked to survey the departments and agencies to determine how much OR is being performed; assess how the results of OR are being used in decision making; recommend a test cases(s) for using OR methodologies; and recommend steps DoD can take to institutionalize the use of OR in future DoD decision making. Illustrations.