This book presents a comprehensive source document on intelligence and security oversight and review. It compares the oversight arrangements found in nine countries—New Zealand, Australia, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and South Africa. This is done through an analysis of a wide range of areas including statutory basis, agencies overseen, membership, tenure, appointment/dismissal, mandate, powers, access to classified information, complaints function, reporting and, in the case of parliamentary committees, the frequency of meetings. Within an annotated bibliography section Richardson and Gilmour also provide detailed summaries of other relevant research and commentary aligned with oversight and review practices. Intelligence and Security Oversight: An Annotated Bibliography and Comparative Analysis comprehensively demonstrates the powers and limitations placed with, and on, oversight bodies, appealing to academics, researchers and practitioners in the intelligence and security environment.

This book examines how key developments in international relations in recent years have affected intelligence agencies and their oversight. Since the turn of the millennium, intelligence agencies have been operating in a tense and rapidly changing security environment. This book addresses the impact of three factors on intelligence oversight: the growth of more complex terror threats, such as those caused by the rise of Islamic State; the colder East-West climate following Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea; and new challenges relating to the large-scale intelligence collection and intrusive surveillance practices revealed by Edward Snowden. This volume evaluates the impact these factors have had on security and intelligence services in a range of countries, together with the challenges that they present for intelligence oversight bodies to adapt in response. With chapters surveying developments in Norway, Romania, the UK, Belgium, France, the USA, Canada and Germany, the coverage is varied, wide and up-to-date. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, security studies and International Relations.

This study offers the first detailed examination of the varied means by which parliament through its committees and the work of individual members has sought to scrutinise the British intelligence and security agencies and the government's use of intelligence.

Amy Zegart examines the weaknesses of US intelligence oversight and why those deficiencies have persisted, despite the unprecedented importance of intelligence in today's environment. She argues that many of the biggest oversight problems lie with Congress—the institution, not the parties or personalities—showing how Congress has collectively and persistently tied its own hands in overseeing intelligence.

This volume examines the investigation by the 1975 Senate Select Committee (‘Church Committee’) into US intelligence abuses during the Cold War, and considers its lessons for the current ‘war on terror’. This report remains the most thorough public record of America’s intelligence services, and many of the legal boundaries operating on US intelligence agencies today are the direct result of reforms proposed by the Church Committee, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The Church Committee also drew attention to the importance of constitutional government as a Congressional body overseeing the activities of the Executive branch. Placing the legacy of the Church Committee in the context of the contemporary debate over US national security and democratic governance, the book brings together contributions from distinguished policy leaders and scholars of law, intelligence and political science.

Exploring how intelligence professionals view accountability in the context of twenty-first century politics How can democratic governments hold intelligence and security agencies accountable when what they do is largely secret? Using the UK as a case study, this book addresses this question by providing the first systematic exploration of how accountability is understood inside the secret world. It is based on new interviews with current and former UK intelligence practitioners, as well as extensive research into the performance and scrutiny of the UK intelligence machinery. The result is the first detailed analysis of how intelligence professionals view their role, what they feel keeps them honest, and how far external overseers impact on their work Moving beyond the conventional focus on oversight, the book examines how accountability works in the day to day lives of these organizations, and considers the impact of technological and social changes, such as artificial intelligence and social media. The UK is a useful case study as it is an important actor in global intelligence, gathering material that helps inform global decisions on such issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, transnational crime, and breaches of international humanitarian law. On the flip side, the UK was a major contributor to the intelligence failures leading to the Iraq war in 2003, and its agencies were complicit in the widely discredited U.S. practices of torture and “rendition” of terrorism suspects. UK agencies have come under greater scrutiny since those actions, but it is clear that problems remain. The book concludes with a series of suggestions for improvement, including the creation of intelligence ethics committees, allowing the public more input into intelligence decisions. The issues explored in this book have important implications for researchers, intelligence professionals, overseers, and the public when it comes to understanding and scrutinizing intelligence practice.