Integration of financial sector issues into bilateral surveillance has been a long-standing challenge. Financial stability is a key component of the domestic and external stability of members and is important for the promotion of the “stable system of exchange rates” envisaged under Article IV. But although financial sector issues and policies are at the core of the Fund’s surveillance mandate, their effective integration has been a challenge. To address this challenge, it is proposed to adopt a more risk-based approach to financial sector surveillance by making FSAP stability assessments part of Article IV surveillance for members with systemically important financial sectors.

This paper presents the staff analysis underpinning two central elements of the proposal to make financial stability assessments under the FSAP mandatory for members with systemically important financial sectors: the definition of systemic importance used in the paper and the methodology for identifying members with systemically important financial sectors (Section II); and the review of the literature and industry practices that form the basis for the staff proposal to conduct these mandatory financial stability assessments at a frequency of about three years (Section III).

Ireland has considerably strengthened financial sector regulation and supervision since the 2016 FSAP, aided by the ECB/SSM, and is working with European and international regulators to strengthen oversight of the large market-based finance (MBF) sector. This strengthening is evidenced by a successful navigation through the challenges of Brexit and the pandemic. Despite global headwinds, Ireland is exiting the pandemic with strong economic growth and a highly capitalized and liquid banking system. The financial system has grown rapidly and in complexity, especially after Brexit, and Ireland has become a European base for large financial groups. The MBF sector has grown to the second largest in Europe, with global interlinkages.

This paper evaluates the risks and vulnerabilities of the German financial system and reviews both the German regulatory and supervisory framework and implementation of the common European framework insofar as it is relevant for Germany. The country is home to two global systemically important financial institutions, Deutsche Bank AG and Allianz SE. The system is also very heterogeneous, with a range of business models and a large number of smaller banks and insurers. The regulatory landscape has changed profoundly with strengthened solvency and liquidity regulations for banks (the EU Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive IV), and the introduction of macroprudential tools.

This paper discusses the findings of the Financial System Stability Assessment for Sweden. The Swedish financial system is large and highly interconnected, putting a premium on the accompanying policy framework. Relative to the size of the domestic economy, the financial system is among Europe’s largest. It features complex domestic and international linkages, reflecting Sweden’s role as a regional financial hub. However, the macrofinancial risks have grown since 2011, for example the rising share of highly indebted households. Stress tests also suggest that banks and nonbanks are largely resilient to solvency shocks, but concerns persist about the ability of bank models to capture unexpected losses.

This paper discusses the impact of the rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in the financial sector. It highlights the benefits these technologies bring in terms of financial deepening and efficiency, while raising concerns about its potential in widening the digital divide between advanced and developing economies. The paper advances the discussion on the impact of this technology by distilling and categorizing the unique risks that it could pose to the integrity and stability of the financial system, policy challenges, and potential regulatory approaches. The evolving nature of this technology and its application in finance means that the full extent of its strengths and weaknesses is yet to be fully understood. Given the risk of unexpected pitfalls, countries will need to strengthen prudential oversight.

This Financial System Stability Assessment paper discusses that Canada has enjoyed favorable macroeconomic outcomes over the past decades, and its vibrant financial system continues to grow robustly. However, macrofinancial vulnerabilities—notably, elevated household debt and housing market imbalances—remain substantial, posing financial stability concerns. Various parts of the financial system are directly exposed to the housing market and/or linked through housing finance. The financial system would be able to manage severe macrofinancial shocks. Major deposit-taking institutions would remain resilient, but mortgage insurers would need additional capital in a severe adverse scenario. Housing finance is broadly resilient, notwithstanding some weaknesses in the small non-prime mortgage lending segment. Although banks’ overall capital buffers are adequate, additional required capital for mortgage exposures, along with measures to increase risk-based differentiation in mortgage pricing, would be desirable. This would help ensure adequate through-the cycle buffers, improve mortgage risk-pricing, and limit procyclical effects induced by housing market corrections.