How can the Army help make key civilian agencies more capable partners in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations? The authors identify the civilian agencies that should be involved in such operations, then locate the necessary skill sets. They then assess the capacity of the civilian agencies to participate in SSTR operations and analyze the recurring structural problems that have plagued their attempts to do so.

In the aftermath of the U.S.-led ousters of the Taliban and Ba'athist regimes, and as part of the U.S. strategy to deal with transnational terrorist groups, there has been a great deal of activity focused on revising the way that the United States plans and conducts Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The primary emphasis of the changes has been to ensure a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and to mobilize and involve all available U.S. government assets in a SSTR operation. The use of the term SSTR to describe these types of operations is important in comprehending fully the scope of the effort. SSTR operations are civilian-led and conducted and coordinated with the involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners. While military assets are an essential component of many SSTR operations, specific military goals and objectives are only a portion of the larger SSTR operation. The following set of definitions, taken from the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept,1 provides an explanation of the term.

In 2004-2006, the U.S. government acted to revise the way that the planning and implementation of Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations are conducted. The primary emphasis of the changes was on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing and involving all available U.S. government assets in the effort. The proximate reason for the policy shift stems from the exposing of gaps in the U.S. ability to administer Afghanistan and Iraq after the U.S.-led ousters of the Taliban and Ba'athist regimes. But the effort to create U.S. government capabilities to conduct SSTR operations in a more unified and coherent fashion rests on the deeper conviction that, as part of the U.S. strategy to deal with transnational terrorist groups, the United States must have the capabilities to increase the governance capacities of weak states, reduce the drivers of and catalysts to conflict, and assist in peacebuilding at all stages of pre- or post-conflict transformation. According to the Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to SSTR operations, these operations are civilian-led and conducted and coordinated with the involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners. Although military assets are an essential component of many SSTR operations, specific military goals and objectives are only a portion of the larger SSTR operation.

The US military will continue to play the leading role in stabilization and reconstruction missions in hostile environments. Past efforts to achieve an effective integration of interagency capabilities for these missions have been limited at best. There is a critical need for fully integrated interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that go well beyond past attempts at mere civil-military cooperation or collaboration. This paper focuses on how the military can better integrate civilian personnel and capabilities when it has the lead in stability operations. It also explores how to effectively transition to a civilian leading role in these missions. The paper first provides context by reviewing select lessons from several US operations executed since the end of the Cold War. Next, it assesses recent initiatives and military doctrinal changes that are designed to address these issues. It then explores several new civil-military organizational innovations that address these issues, such as US Africa Command and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. It also highlights the increasing reliance contractors who can fill the gaps in military and government civilian capabilities in these areas. Finally, it concludes with several recommendations for the Department of Defense to improve civil-military integration during stabilization missions.

Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations, represents a milestone in Army doctrine. With a focus on transforming conflict, managing violence when it does occur and maintaining stable peace, The U.S. Army Stability Operations Field Manual (otherwise known as FM 3-07) signals a stark departure from traditional military doctrine. The Army officially acknowledges the complex continuum from conflict to peace, outlines the military's responsibility to provide stability and security, and recognizes the necessity of collaboration, coordination, and cooperation among military, state, commercial, and non-government organizations in nation-building efforts. The manual reflects a truly unique collaboration between the Army and a wide array of experts from hundreds of groups across the United States Government, the intergovernmental and non-governmental communities, America's allies around the world, and the private sector. All branches of the armed forces, U.S. agencies ranging from the State Department to Homeland Security to Health and Human Services, international agencies from the United Nations to the Red Cross to the World Bank, countries from the United Kingdom to India to South Africa, private think tanks from RAND to the United States Institute of Peace to the Center for New American Security, all took part in the shaping of this document. The U.S. Army Stability Operations FieldManual, marks just the second time in modern history that the U.S. Army has worked with a private publisher to produce a military doctrinal document. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV is Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Shawn Brimley, Fellow, Center for a New American Security Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans "It is a roadmap from conflict to peace, a practical guidebook for adaptive, creative leadership at a critical time in our history. It institutionalizes the hard-won lessons of the past while charting a path for tomorrow. This manual postures our military forces for the challenges of an uncertain future, an era of persistent conflict where the unflagging bravery of our Soldiers will continue to carry the banner of freedom, hope, and opportunity to the people of the world." —From the foreword by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commander of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

The military invariably conducts conflict and post-conflict operations with other agencies. These agencies must be prepared and resourced for their participation, including transition from or to serving as lead-agency for the operation. The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to define war or conflict more broadly, and incorporate other agencies, especially Department of State (DoS), into its planning and execution phases much earlier and more completely than is now the practice. The military's changing role requires it to better understand world cultures where it operates and the organizational cultures of agencies with whom it works. The DoS has begun the organizational change necessary to become an equal operational partner with the military, but remains inadequately funded. The United States clearly recognizes the need for international peacekeeping partners; its difficulty is to determine the appropriate role for those collaborators, to determine needs for assistance to become better partners, and to effectively manage that assistance.