This paper examines inflation dynamics in the United States since 1960, with a particular focus on the Great Recession. A puzzle emerges when Phillips curves estimated over 1960-2007 are ussed to predice inflation over 2008-2010: inflation should have fallen by more than it did. We resolve this puzzle with two modifications of the Phillips curve, both suggested by theories of costly price adjustment: we measure core inflation with the median CPI inflation rate, and we allow the slope of the Phillips curve to change with the level and vairance of inflation. We then examine the hypothesis of anchored inflation expectations. We find that expectations have been fully "shock-anchored" since the 1980s, while "level anchoring" has been gradual and partial, but significant. It is not clear whether expectations are sufficiently anchored to prevent deflation over the next few years. Finally, we show that the Great Recession provides fresh evidence against the New Keynesian Phillips curve with rational expectations.

Notwithstanding persistently-high unemployment following the Great Recession, inflation in the United States has been remarkably stable. We find that a traditional Phillips curve describes the behavior of inflation reasonably well since the 1960s. Using a non-linear Kalman filter that allows for time-varying parameters, we find that three factors have contributed to the observed stability of inflation: inflation expectations have become better anchored and to a lower level; the slope of the Phillips curve has flattened; and the importance of import-price inflation has increased.

Inflation is regarded by the many as a menace that damages business and can only make life worse for households. Keeping it low depends critically on ensuring that firms and workers expect it to be low. So expectations of inflation are a key influence on national economic welfare. This collection pulls together a galaxy of world experts (including Roy Batchelor, Richard Curtin and Staffan Linden) on inflation expectations to debate different aspects of the issues involved. The main focus of the volume is on likely inflation developments. A number of factors have led practitioners and academic observers of monetary policy to place increasing emphasis recently on inflation expectations. One is the spread of inflation targeting, invented in New Zealand over 15 years ago, but now encompassing many important economies including Brazil, Canada, Israel and Great Britain. Even more significantly, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the United States Federal Bank are the leading members of another group of monetary institutions all considering or implementing moves in the same direction. A second is the large reduction in actual inflation that has been observed in most countries over the past decade or so. These considerations underscore the critical – and largely underrecognized - importance of inflation expectations. They emphasize the importance of the issues, and the great need for a volume that offers a clear, systematic treatment of them. This book, under the steely editorship of Peter Sinclair, should prove very important for policy makers and monetary economists alike.

This is the first comprehensive study in the context of EMDEs that covers, in one consistent framework, the evolution and global and domestic drivers of inflation, the role of expectations, exchange rate pass-through and policy implications. In addition, the report analyzes inflation and monetary policy related challenges in LICs. The report documents three major findings: In First, EMDE disinflation over the past four decades was to a significant degree a result of favorable external developments, pointing to the risk of rising EMDE inflation if global inflation were to increase. In particular, the decline in EMDE inflation has been supported by broad-based global disinflation amid rapid international trade and financial integration and the disruption caused by the global financial crisis. While domestic factors continue to be the main drivers of short-term movements in EMDE inflation, the role of global factors has risen by one-half between the 1970s and the 2000s. On average, global shocks, especially oil price swings and global demand shocks have accounted for more than one-quarter of domestic inflation variatio--and more in countries with stronger global linkages and greater reliance on commodity imports. In LICs, global food and energy price shocks accounted for another 12 percent of core inflation variatio--half more than in advanced economies and one-fifth more than in non-LIC EMDEs. Second, inflation expectations continue to be less well-anchored in EMDEs than in advanced economies, although a move to inflation targeting and better fiscal frameworks has helped strengthen monetary policy credibility. Lower monetary policy credibility and exchange rate flexibility have also been associated with higher pass-through of exchange rate shocks into domestic inflation in the event of global shocks, which have accounted for half of EMDE exchange rate variation. Third, in part because of poorly anchored inflation expectations, the transmission of global commodity price shocks to domestic LIC inflation (combined with unintended consequences of other government policies) can have material implications for poverty: the global food price spikes in 2010-11 tipped roughly 8 million people into poverty.

This book presents a notable group of macroeconomists who describe the unprecedented events and often extraordinary policies put in place to limit the economic damage suffered during the Great Recession and then to put the economy back on track. Contributers include Barry Eichengreen; Gary Burtless; Donald Kohn; Laurence Ball, J. Bradford DeLong, and Lawrence H. Summers; and Kathryn M.E. Dominguez.

Over the last decade, the developed world has been hit by the deepest recession since the Great Depression and a rollercoaster in commodity prices. And yet, core inflation has been both low and fairly stable. A rule of thumb that inflation is always near 2%, though more often than not just a bit below, has been quite reliable. The young, or those with short memories, could be forgiven for looking condescendingly at their older friends who speak of inflation as a major economic problem. But, like Galileo Galilei told his contemporaries who thought the Earth was immovable, "Eppur si muove" ("and yet it moves"). Since most societies regard stable inflation as a goal, it is tempting to describe this solid anchoring of inflation as a great achievement of monetary policy. But what if it was just luck? Will the great anchoring soon lead a great bout of inflation, just as the Great Moderation was followed by the Great Recession? Do we need to change the way in which policy is set to better handle changed circumstances since the financial crash? The 19th Geneva Report on the World Economy starts by analysing outcomes across countries for the last ten years. Inflation is compared with its behaviour in the period before the financial crash to assess the extent to which it really has been stable, what the proximate causes are, and whether it will stay low in future. The report then assesses theories of inflation in light of these facts, and tries to make sense of them. Next, the report turns to the question we posed at the start: was it good policy or good luck that prevented severe deflation and kept inflation relatively steady? A description of what policies were adopted and how they interacted with economic shocks informs the conclusions on appropriate policies--both monetary and fiscal--for the future. The report pays particular attention tothe role of central banks and the extent of their activities.