"Developed from lectures given at Western Michigan University as part of the 1996-1997 lecture series"--P. 6. Includes bibliographical references and index.

Controlling inflation is among the most important objectives of economic policy. By maintaining price stability, policy makers are able to reduce uncertainty, improve price-monitoring mechanisms, and facilitate more efficient planning and allocation of resources, thereby raising productivity. This volume focuses on understanding the causes of the Great Inflation of the 1970s and ’80s, which saw rising inflation in many nations, and which propelled interest rates across the developing world into the double digits. In the decades since, the immediate cause of the period’s rise in inflation has been the subject of considerable debate. Among the areas of contention are the role of monetary policy in driving inflation and the implications this had both for policy design and for evaluating the performance of those who set the policy. Here, contributors map monetary policy from the 1960s to the present, shedding light on the ways in which the lessons of the Great Inflation were absorbed and applied to today’s global and increasingly complex economic environment.

Experience during the last ten years has encouraged economists to review their judgements regarding behavior and policy. The experience of the 1970s brought inflation to prominence in the minds of policymakers and academic economists, raising questions about labor markets and other supply considerations, but also resulting in an atmosphere conducive to increasing attention on monetary and financial variables. An account of some of the issues that, in this environment, occupied the thoughts of economists and conditioned the responses of policymakers in various Western countries is what this volume is about.

The inflation of the 1970s represented the greatest peacetime disruption of the Western economies since the Depression. Even as inflation receded, the recession in its wake brought more joblessness than at any time since the 1930s. The governments of industrialized nations found that the economic policies they had developed since World War II no longer assured price stability or high employment. What are the lessons of over a decade of economic difficulty? In this conference volume, which focuses on aspects of the crisis that economists often presuppose to be beyond control, the authors analyze the political and social underpinning of inflation and recession. Part 1 places the economic problems of the 1970s in the historical context of postwar development and then compares economic and political science analyses of inflation. Part 2 examines how rivalries between social groups affect inflationary processes. One chapter draws on the history of Latin American inflation to suggest the conflicts in play. Two others weigh the role of labor and industry in the formation of economic policy. And another shows how rivalry between countries, like rivalry between classes at home, permitted inflation to rise. The chapters in part 3 contest the claim that big government or big labor causes inflation. Two studies emphasize that a high degree of public expenditure does not itself lead to inflation. Further contributions explore the role of central banks and subject such concepts as the political business cycle to critical analysis. Part 4 comprises case studies about macroeconomic policymaking in four nations: Italy, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. The studies reveal what institutional attributes rendered those countries resistant to inflation or vulnerable to economic setback. In the last part, the editors pull together the findings and lay out the contemporary political feasibility of alternative approaches to macroeconomic management.

This unique volume offers a definitive new history of European economies at war from 1914 to 1918. It studies how European economies mobilised for war, how existing economic institutions stood up under the strain, how economic development influenced outcomes and how wartime experience influenced post-war economic growth. Leading international experts provide the first systematic comparison of economies at war between 1914 and 1918 based on the best available data for Britain, Germany, France, Russia, the USA, Italy, Turkey, Austria-Hungary and the Netherlands. The editors' overview draws some stark lessons about the role of economic development, the importance of markets and the damage done by nationalism and protectionism. A companion volume to the acclaimed The Economics of World War II, this is a major contribution to our understanding of total war.

“Magisterial. . . . The direct and indirect influence of the Monetary History would be difficult to overstate.”—Ben S. Bernanke, Nobel Prize–winning economist and former chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve From Nobel Prize–winning economist Milton Friedman and his celebrated colleague Anna Jacobson Schwartz, one of the most important economics books of the twentieth century—the landmark work that rewrote the story of the Great Depression and the understanding of monetary policy Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz’s A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 is one of the most influential economics books of the twentieth century. A landmark achievement, it marshaled massive historical data and sharp analytics to argue that monetary policy—steady control of the money supply—matters profoundly in the management of the nation’s economy, especially in navigating serious economic fluctuations. One of the book’s most important chapters, “The Great Contraction, 1929–33” addressed the central economic event of the twentieth century, the Great Depression. Friedman and Schwartz argued that the Federal Reserve could have stemmed the severity of the Depression, but failed to exercise its role of managing the monetary system and countering banking panics. The book served as a clarion call to the monetarist school of thought by emphasizing the importance of the money supply in the functioning of the economy—an idea that has come to shape the actions of central banks worldwide.

Inflation is regarded by the many as a menace that damages business and can only make life worse for households. Keeping it low depends critically on ensuring that firms and workers expect it to be low. So expectations of inflation are a key influence on national economic welfare. This collection pulls together a galaxy of world experts (including Roy Batchelor, Richard Curtin and Staffan Linden) on inflation expectations to debate different aspects of the issues involved. The main focus of the volume is on likely inflation developments. A number of factors have led practitioners and academic observers of monetary policy to place increasing emphasis recently on inflation expectations. One is the spread of inflation targeting, invented in New Zealand over 15 years ago, but now encompassing many important economies including Brazil, Canada, Israel and Great Britain. Even more significantly, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan and the United States Federal Bank are the leading members of another group of monetary institutions all considering or implementing moves in the same direction. A second is the large reduction in actual inflation that has been observed in most countries over the past decade or so. These considerations underscore the critical – and largely underrecognized - importance of inflation expectations. They emphasize the importance of the issues, and the great need for a volume that offers a clear, systematic treatment of them. This book, under the steely editorship of Peter Sinclair, should prove very important for policy makers and monetary economists alike.