"This book brings together the many pieces of India's nuclear puzzle and the ramifications for South Asia. The author examines the choices facing India from New Delhi's point of view in order to discern which future courses of action appear most appealing to Indian security managers. He details how such choices, if acted upon, would affect U.S. strategic interests, India's neighbors, and the world."--BOOK JACKET.

Using a constructivist model, this study brings nuclear arms control and disarmament back into the debates on the future of Indo-Pakistani relations. Constructivism recognizes the independent impact of international norms, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Norm (NNPN), on India and Pakistan’s nuclear behavior. Even though the NNPN does not legally bind them, it is reinforced at the global level, and may lead the South Asian rivals to move in the direction of nuclear arms control and disarmament, thus reducing the costs, dangers, and risks of an eternal strategic rivalry. After examining the main tenets of constructivism in international relations, the works delves into the proliferation debate, discussing nuclear reversal and U.S. policy toward the subcontinent since the G. W. Bush administration. It looks at the prospects for nuclear arms control and disarmament in South Asia after the U.S.-India nuclear deal of 2008, and the nuclear abolitionist wave during the first Obama administration. It concludes with the contribution of social constructivism to understanding how changes in the India-Pakistan nuclear status quo can happen.

This paper describes the evolution of the Non-Proliferation Regime through its major phases and the dynamics of the transformation which marked these phases, through a contextualisation of the security or geo-strategic environment of each phase. This paper has also made a conceptual study of the regime and the philosophical framework that shape the creation of the regime and its major shifts and makes an assessment of the concept of the non-proliferation regime through the Regime Theory framework and attempts to explain the paradigm that shaped the regime’s initial principles and goes on to explain the evolution in terms of the paradigmatic shifts. The attempt is to analyse the Indian approach to the regime through its response to the major structures and norms formulated by the regime during its evolution. It explains India’s policy on the regime’s fundamental tools on three key areas: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The analysis being done through these categories will look at India’s policy on or approaches towards key instruments like the NPT, nuclear test ban, ending fissile materials production, safeguards, export controls, etc. Lastly the paper looks into the dynamics of the post-1998 and post nuclear-deal phase when India is supposed to be attempting to integrate with the regime and its principles. How is India attempting to do this? What are the key challenges and obstacles towards this objective? What are the means for greater Indian integration with the regime? My idea is to actually bring out the new diplomacy that India has, how the global politics is viewing India’s new status after the Indo-US nuclear treaty, and lastly to bring out the changing dynamics in the nuclear diplomacy. India has to play a critical role in tackling these challenges. India has to play the role of a responsible player in minimising proliferation dangers by actively engaging in the non-proliferation regime.

This book examines the Indian nuclear policy, doctrine, strategy and posture, clarifying the elastic concept of credible minimum deterrence at the center of the country's approach to nuclear security. This concept, Karnad demonstrates, permits the Indian nuclear forces to be beefed up, size and quality-wise, and to acquire strategic reach and clout, even as the qualifier minimum suggests an overarching concern for moderation and economical use of resources, and strengthens India's claims to be a responsible nuclear weapon state. Based on interviews with Indian political leaders, nuclear scientists, and military and civilian nuclear policy planners, it provides unique insights into the workings of India's nuclear decision-making and deterrence system. Moreover, by juxtaposing the Indian nuclear policy and thinking against the theories of nuclear war and strategic deterrence, nuclear escalation, and nuclear coercion, offers a strong theoretical grounding for the Indian approach to nuclear war and peace, nuclear deterrence and escalation, nonproliferation and disarmament, and to limited war in a nuclearized environment. It refutes the alarmist notions about a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia, etc. which derive from stereotyped analysis of India-Pakistan wars, and examines India's likely conflict scenarios involving China and, minorly, Pakistan.

From 2005 to 2008, the United States and India negotiated a pathbreaking nuclear agreement that recognised India's nuclear status and lifted longstanding embargoes on civilian nuclear cooperation with India. This book offers the most comprehensive account of the diplomacy and domestic politics behind this nuclear agreement. Domestic politics considerably impeded - and may have entirely prevented - US nuclear accommodation with India; when domestic obstacles were overcome, US–India negotiations advanced; and even after negotiations advanced, domestic factors placed conditions on and affected the scope of US–India nuclear cooperation. Such a study provides new insights into this major event in international politics, and it offers a valuable framework for analysing additional US strategic and nuclear dialogues with India and with other countries.

The author presided over the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in 1995, which decided to extend the treaty indefinitely. The conference also reviewed the performance of the treaty over the 1990-1995 period. This book is an analytical record of a major multilateral conference, involving 175 countries, that succeeded in adopting final decisions without a vote. With the 2005 review taking place in May 2005, amid major concerns over non-adherence to the treaty and non-disclosure by several states, this is a relevant dissection of elements that can lead to successful outcomes in such multilateral conferences.

India’s Nuclear Diplomacy After Pokhran II presents an analytical, perspective-based and narrative exposition of the facts and issues involved in international nuclear gamesmanship, taking every care to maintain objectivity and balance. This book breaks new ground by focusing on India’s nuclear diplomacy with the major global and regional powers, and the rationale of its stand vis-à-vis the NPT and CTBT. It unravels the intricacies and technicalities of the post-Pokhran II diplomacy in lucid and comprehensible phraseology.