This NAO report (HC 1035, session 2007-08, ISBN 9780102954371) focuses on the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) investigation of complaints against the police. The IPCC has responsibility for the performance of the whole police complaints system and has a remit to investigate complaints and conduct matters involving police officers. It can recommend appropriate action by the police force concerned and forward information to the Crown Prosecution Service. It employs just under 400 staff and has a net expenditure for 2007-08 of £32.2 million, with £30.1 million financed from the Home Office. In 2007-08 nearly 29,000 complaints were made against the police. Most were dealt with locally by the relevant police force, and did not involve the IPCC. The NAO findings include: supervised investigations are not the most effective use of IPCC resources; the IPCC is facing an increasing workload when its funding is being reduced; the IPCC is not yet providing full guidance and training for its staff; there was a number of investigations where there was no auditable record that an IPCC Commissioner had reviewed and approved an investigation report; the review functioning of the IPCC is not operating as intended; there is no formal review of cases after they have been completed; the work carried out by the IPCC is not subject to external scrutiny; there is significant inconsistency across the IPCC regions in the way recommendations arising from investigations are being followed up; no single organisation has responsibility for monitoring the implementation of recommendations by police forces; the IPCC should undertake regular surveys to obtain feedback and identify actions that need to be taken to improve client satisfaction.

When public trust in the police is tested by complaints of negligence, misconduct and corruption, a strong watchdog is vital to get to the truth: but the IPCC leaves the public frustrated and faithless. The public are bewildered by its continued reliance on the very forces it is investigating. The IPCC investigated just a handful of cases and often arrived at the scene late, when the trail had gone cold. Serious cases involving police corruption or misconduct are left underinvestigated, while the Commission devotes resources to less serious complaints. It is woefully underequipped to supervise the 43 forces of England and Wales, never mind the UKBA, HMRC, NCA and all the private sector agencies involved in policing. It is buried under the weight of poor police investigations and bound by its limited powers. The Committee makes a number of recommendations including: that the Commission should be given a statutory power to require a force to implement its findings and in the most serious cases, the Commission should instigate a "year on review" to ensure that its recommendations have been properly carried out, the Commission should be given a statutory power to require a force to implement its findings and the most serious cases, the Commission should instigate a 'year on review', the Commission's jurisdiction should be extended to cover private sector contractors

Response to HC 494, session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780215053299)

This report examines how well the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) is managing its resources, the adequacy of the IPCC's quality assurance arrangements and how far the IPCC has sought to assess the impact of its work. Complaints against the police of a serious nature requiring IPCC involvement led to it opening 100 independent investigations in 2007-08, compared to 31 in 2004-05. The IPCC also received 4,141 appeals about local police investigations which was a four-fold increase on the number in 2004-05. As a result of its increasing workload, the IPCC has found itself working at above full capacity. The IPCC has no formal quality control framework in place. The IPCC's Commissioners have not been formally approving all investigation reports, one of their key responsibilities. Public confidence in the police complaints system is essential. While the IPCC has commissioned research to look at levels of public confidence in the complaints system, it has not sought the views of complainants, police officers and appellants about their experiences of the IPCC's processes. The absence of feedback from those who have had direct experience of dealing with the IPCC is a significant oversight which the IPCC is now rectifying. There is a lack of clarity about who has responsibility for monitoring the implementation of IPCC recommendations. The IPCC accepts responsibility for recording each police force's acceptance or rejection of the recommendations following an investigation, but not for monitoring the implementation of the recommendations. The IPCC has, therefore, only limited evidence on the impact of its work.

Despite an ever-increasing workload the IPCC does little to prevent complaints against police behaviour in the first instance by improving forces' complaints procedures, and despite a budget of £35 million per annum the organisation lacks clear measures of success. Despite the IPCC possessing staff of around 400 people, the vast majority of complaints against police behaviour are investigated by the force concerned. Of the 30,000-plus complaints against police behaviour last year less than 250 were directly managed by the IPCC which represents less than 10 per cent of "serious" complaints. In 99 cases out of 100, and despite the existence of an independent, statutory body, complaints made against police behaviour will be investigated by the police. The Committee also raised concerns at the use of ex-police officers within the IPCC, these officers can often end up investigating possible ex-colleagues in their former force. The Home Affairs Committee is convinced that the police should be placing a much greater onus on resolving complaints in an open, transparent and satisfactory manner themselves and calls upon the IPCC to produce a detailed plan of how the Commission, working with bodies such as HMIC and NPIA, will improve police performance in this area.

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