This work resulted from my interests in several flDldam ental issues of contemporary phenomenology. Originally, their focal point was 1) the role and importance of the subject in philosophical activity and 2) the subject's finitude. To gain a perspective on these issues, a possible approach seemed to lie in the direction of the transcendental imagination and its relation to tim e. This focus on the imagination, of course, led to Fichte's egological philosophy that explicitly centers on the imagination. Here both issues are raised together. The reader of the Fichtean texts cannot for long hesitate to pose the question of intersubjectivity. These three issues-imagination, reflection, and inter subjectivity-formed the basis of the present work. Since such a work could never be completed if it were not for those num erot5 discussions and friendly conversation with friends and colleagues with whom philosophy is always alive, I wish to acknowledge my gratitude specifically to the following people: Professor Andre Schuwer, of Duquesne University, for his encouragement, critical reading of the work, and his comments that have greatly aided me in the writing of the present work; Professor John Sallis, Chairman of the Philosophy Department of Duquesne University, whose interest in Fichte provided invaluable insights and approaches to the issues; Professor Paul Ricoeur, University of Paris and University of Chicago, whose reading and encouragement greatly helped in the work's publication; Professor Samuel Ijsseling, University of Leuven, who introduced me to Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Professor G. A.

Our experience of other individuals as minded beings goes hand in hand with the awareness that they have a unique epistemic and emotional perspective on the experienced objects and situations. The same object can be seen from many different points of view, an event can awaken different emotional reactions in different individuals, and our position-takings can in part be mediated by our belonging to some social or cultural groups. All these phenomena can be described by referring to the metaphor of perspective. Assuming that there are different, and irreducible, perspectives we can take on the experienced world, and on others as experiencing the same world, the phenomenon of mutual understanding can consistently be understood in terms of perspectival flexibility. This edited volume investigates the different processes in which perspectival flexibility occurs in social life and particularly focuses on the constitutive role of imagination in such processes. It includes original works in philosophy and psychopathology showing how perspectival flexibility and social cognition are grounded on the interplay of direct perception and imagination.

Search Without Idols is a study of human transcendence in the context of human striving, projecting, surpassing, overcoming. This power is central to man's search for wholeness. Such transcendence makes reality tolerable. It provides us with ~m impressive array of human responses which enable us to cope. But it also provides the excesses that go beyond human striving. Nothing seems to be off-limits to this ubiquitous power. Such a state of surpassing limits is what we find in the relation between the human search for wholeness and the quest for external totalities which lies beyond the human context. Such soaring flights beyond the capacity of human striving are hard to control, impossible to show responsibility-for and beyond the reach of criteria. The reach exceeds both our grasp and our control. Transcendence, then, is a greatly used and much abuse~ human power. Its activities have never ceased to amaze me, its excesses have always troubled me even from the beginning of my studies. This book is not an exercise in self-clarification. I have some thoughts on the matter which I wish to share with the reader. Perhaps we can mutually appreciate the great gift without compromising our sanity. Part I will provide a new look at the meaning of transcendence.

The object of this study is to find a coherent theoretical approach to three problems which appear to interrelate in complex ways: (1) What is the ontological status of consciousness? (2) How can there be 'un conscious,' 'prereflective' or 'self-alienated' consciousness? And (3) Is there a 'self' or 'ego' formed by means of the interrelation of more elementary states of consciousness? The motivation for combining such a diversity of difficult questions is that we often learn more by looking at interrelations of problems than we could by viewing them only in isola tion. The three questions posed here have emerged as especially prob lematic in the context of twentieth century philosophy. 1. The question of the ontological status of consciousness The question 'What is consciousness?' is one of the most perplexing in philosophy-so perplexing that many have been motivated to proceed as though consciousness did not exist. If William James was speaking rhetorically when he said "Consciousness does not exist," 1 many behaviorists of the recent past were not. 2 James meant only to imply that consciousness is not an independently existing soul-substance, along side physical substances. He did not mean that we do not really 'have' consciousness, and he did not provide final resolution for the problem of the causal interrelations between consciousness and the physical realm (e. g. , our bodies). Many recent philosophers and psychologists, however, try to proceed as though these problems did not exist.

The full century that has elapsed since Nietzsche was at the height of his work did not obliterate his impact. In many ways he is still a contemporary philosopher, even in that sense of 'contemporary' which points to the future. We may have outgrown his style (always, however, admirable and exciting to read), his sense of drama, his creative exaggeration, his sometimes flamboy ant posture of a rebel wavering between the heroic and the puerile. Yet Nietzsche's critique of transcendental values and, especially, his attack on the inherited conceptions of rationality remain pertinent and continue to pro voke anew cultural critique or dissent. Today Nietzsche is no longer discussed apologetically, nor is his radicalism shunned or suppressed. That his work remains the object of extremely diverse readings is befitting a philosopher who replaced the concept of truth with that of interpretation. It is, indeed, around the concept of interpretation that much of the rem:wed interest in Nietzsche seems to center today. Special emphasis is being laid on his manner of doing philosophy, and his views on interpretation and the genealogical method are often re-read in the context of contemporary hermeneutics and "deconstructionist" positions.

The methodology of the study of the history of political thought is an area of study which has occupied my interests for nearly a decade. I was introduced to the subject in University College, Swansea. My teachers there provided me with an excellent grounding in political studies. I am particularly indebted to Bruce Haddock, Peter Nicholson and W. H. Greenleaf. Professor Greenleaf was kind enough to supply me with a copy of his bibliography and copies of two of his unpublished papers. I continued to pursue my interest in methodology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. I am indebted to Ken Minogue and Robert Orr who taught me there. My greatest debt is to Dr. Joseph Femia ofthe University of Liverpool who devoted a great deal of time to considering the arguments presented here. His criticisms and suggestions for improvement proved to be invaluable. I would also like to thank Alan Ryan for his general comments and encouraging advice. It would be remiss of me if I neglected to express my gratitude to Dewi Beynon who was my first teacher of politics. The research for this project was carried out in the following places; The British Library of Political Science, London; The Sidney Jones Library, University of Liverpool; The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh; The Main Library, University of Edinburgh; The Arts and Social Science Library, University College, Cardiff; and the Bodleian Library, Oxford.